THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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A PUBLISHER ON THE DEMAND FOR RELIGIOUS BOOKS

IT is the prerogative of old age and the privilege of the middle-aged to criticize youth. Time, in the process of forcing upon us the unwelcome knowledge that we have reached years of discretion, throws a veil before our eyes which partially dims youth's vision. If, being myself middle-aged, I defend modern youth, I do so not because I think youth is incapable of defending itself, but because I feel we are in urgent need of defending ourselves. There is nothing alarmingly wrong with the young men and women of to-day unless it be lack of years —a disability that time will efface in them as inevitably as the metamorphosis overtook their progenitors.

I find it difficult to distinguish any great moral difference between my generation's aptitude for sowing its oats and the present generation's partiality for burning its boats. The youth of my day was conspicuously sound of body and unselfish of mind when faced with the inhuman test of its humanity in the summer of 1914. I have not the faintest shadow of doubt that youth to-day, if called upon, would acquit itself with similar heroism and self-sacrifice.

One of the most fascinating aspects of an editor's or publisher's career is the opportunity it affords him of estimating what are the concerns and interests that occupy his fellows. If, for

example, we are able to say that youth, on the whole, reads seriously, it is reasonably safe to assume that youth thinks seriously. Fortunately, there is overwhelming evidence of the fact that young men and women are reading books which stimulate the mind and quicken the sensibilities. At the present time, the sales of books on religion and theology are phenomenal. I have the authority of one of the oldest established theological booksellers in Great Britain for the statement that youth's intense interest in religious literature is greater to-day than at any previous period in his long career. Nor is this interest either a passing phase or a sudden phenomenon. On the contrary, it has been a gradual process of evolution, eclectic in the sense that it has discarded worn-out theories of a separatist sort and grasped with eager hands the living realities of an enlightened Christian faith.

Even the materialists cannot refute the statement that the Bible is the best-seller among best-sellers. But I have a suspicion that very few people are aware of the fact that with the single exception of fiction, books on religion and theolgy are, year in and year out, the bread and butter of the bookseller. They sell in increasingly large numbers, but what is far more important and significant, they sell consistently. In this connexion, the only qualification that need be made is that the old-fashioned type of devotional manual, the ultra-sentimental tract and the badly-written religious story with a moral are almost entirely defunct. Religious literature, to-day, is stronger, saner and gratifyingly well written. It seeks to interpret life. And youth, in its search for knowledge and understanding, welcomes the books which contemporary Christian apologists provide with so much artistry and conviction.

My bookseller friend whom I have already quoted was emphatic on one point in particular. The widespread reading of religious books is not confined to the youth of any one class. It is fashionable to denounce the young men and women at the Universities for their frivolity and moral turpitude. Similarly, the Public Schools are condemned for turning out youth which displays no greater interest in life than the bare desire to go on living. In actual fact, however, the bulk of the youth from these two classes is almost tragically obsessed with the major problems of existence. And what is true of the Universities and our Public

Schools is no less true of our secondary and higher-grade educational institutions. In short, it is good to reflect that our young men and women are keen and healthily alert to the necessity of finding, for themselves, a working and satisfying philosophy which will do justice to their hearts without discrediting their heads. Contemporary religious literature functions as a living moral force in the affairs of men because it insists on dealing with first principles and inescapable fundamentals.

The books which are selling in hundreds of thousands to-day are those which deal most faithfully and creatively with the personality of Christ; with the implication of His teachings in the light of present-day social and economic problems; and, finally and inevitably, with the absorbing question of Immortality itself. If I presume to mention a few books which are to-day moulding the lives of the new generation, I do so because there are occasions when statistics are more eloquent than phrases. Many popular novelists would consider themselves inhumanly lucky if the sales of their novels reached one-tenth of the figures attained by the 'best-sellers' on religion and theology.

Prominent in the publication of religious literature are such organizations as the British and Foreign Bible Society and the Christian Student Movement. The extremely courteous and energetic secretary of the latter, to whom I briefly outlined the views expressed here, assured me that it would be impossible to accuse me of optimism or exaggeration in claiming that youth reads and digests contemporary religious literature with enthusiasm.

Here are official figures more eloquent than any verbal argument: Dr. Fosdick's *Manhood of Christ* (125,000), Glover's *Jesus of History* (100,000), Herbert Gray's two books, *Men, Women and God* and *Christian Adventure* (50,000), Temple's comparatively recent work, *Christian Faith and Life* (18,000), and Leslie Weatherhead's *His Life and Ours* and *The Mastery of Sin* (20,000 each).

The fact that George Bernard Shaw has publicly confessed his admiration for Dean Inge is more than slightly humorous. But G.B.S., in those rare intervals when he is not looking at himself, can be trusted to recognize a good man at sight. And he may well raise his hat in admiration for Dean Inge. The

sales of the two volumes of the best-known of his works, *Outspoken Essays*, have reached 60,000 copies, an amazing total when it is remembered that Dean Inge's books are not published at prices which the man in the street considers cheap. If we turn from Dean Inge, the theological preacher and artist, to Sir Oliver Lodge, the theological scientist, the figures are even more astonishing: *Man and the Universe* (20th edition), *Substance of Faith* (15th edition), *Raymond* (14th edition), and *Reason and Belief* (11th edition).

Two books which continue to sell in hundreds week by week are Shepherd's *Impatience of a Parson* and Russell's *For Sinners Only*. The former has recently reached the one hundred thousand mark and the latter 112,000. I will now quote at random. Paterson Smyth's *People's Life of Christ* (17th edition), Bishop Barnes's *Should Such a Faith Offend?* (15,000), Barry's *Relevance of Christianity* (4th edition), Von Hügel's Essays in two volumes (4th edition) and the late Studdart Kennedy's *The Wicket Gate* (20,000) and *Lies* (44,000).

Finally, I am fortunate in being able to give the reader authentic information regarding the world-wide activities of the British and Foreign Bible Society. A high official at headquarters with whom I discussed the subject confirmed out of his wide and intimate experience all that I have contended in this Introduction. During the past twelve months 10,617,470 volumes of Holy Scripture have been circulated by the Society. During the year twelve new versions have been added to the Society's List of Languages in which the Scriptures are published. Of the twelve, four are African, six are Asiatic, one is American (!), and one European. The total number of Scriptures in English circulated in the *British Isles* last year was 857,000, comprising 415,000 Bibles, 165,000 New Testaments, and 277,000 parts of the Bible. The number of copies of the Scriptures in English sent abroad was 654,000, making a total for home and abroad of 1,511,000. Since its publication in July 1931, 817,000 copies of the Shilling Bible have been issued. The Society's work makes a direct appeal to the youth of all nations, and manifestly its appeal is not made in vain. In the face of the official statistics I have quoted, it would be a stubborn man indeed who would deny that Youth pursues still his quest of the Holy Grail.

It may, or may not be true that we are declining as a nation of church-goers, but it is indisputably true that we are more than ever a nation of Christian thinkers. Personally, I have no hesitation in prophesying that when our sermons reach the high level of our religious literature there will be no need to bemoan the empty seats in either church or chapel. Man's faith is undiminished, and because of it and through it he continues to seek with growing eagerness those things of the spirit and mind which uplift him out of himself, and make him to enter the cosmos of immortality.

CECIL PALMER.

PROFESSOR CLARK'S *ACTS OF THE APOSTLES*.*

The Oxford Professor of Latin, A. C. Clark, has achieved with marvellous care and long study a remarkable edition of the *Acts*. He is bent on a great achievement, *viz.* to cast down what may be called the accepted text since Westcott and Hort's edition, and to set up in its place a text based on the Bezan MS. D and its allies. It is now 51 years since I published a little work, in which I maintained that all the important additions in D are historically true, and give really valuable additions to the record of the 'accepted text'—call it Γ with Professor Clark—that these are additions made to the Lukan text in (probably) the second century, while a true tradition still survived, and that they were made with knowledge and skill. My old friend Mr. Conybeare objected to this in a letter (perhaps also in a published form), on the ground that there is no proof that any such process was ever attempted. The New Testament, however, was commented on; and there is nothing impossible in the theory that marginal comments may have in this case grown into a text, such as Professor Clark founds on D and its allied MSS. Let us call this text, with him, Z, and I may be allowed to speak of him as 'the Editor.'

A copy for review has reached me with the request for this in eight days (lengthened to eleven). To make a proper review worthy of this Edition would need a year of study; but at 82 one has not many years to give to all the work of other kinds that

* *The Acts of the Apostles*. By Professor A. C. Clark, M.A. (Oxford University Press. 1933. £1/10/0.)

presses, though it would be a pure pleasure to spend a year in this task.

The Editor puts the possible alternatives thus, after rejecting Blass's theory that Luke himself published two editions: (1) Z is lengthened from the Lukan text Γ; (2) Γ is shortened from the Lukan text Z. His work is a demonstration that the latter has been the process. I would grant that the process which produced Γ, the accepted text, through the work of a great scholar or group of scholars, was based on the principle of preserving only what he (they) considered quite perfectly attested, and omitting anything that was not as well vouched for: they guarded against anything that might be of the nature of a gloss or a marginal note added by a careful reader. However good such a note might be, it must not be admitted to the text. The revision made after the triumph of Christianity in the Eastern Empire in 323 allows many rough transitions to remain in Γ, but Z makes these rough places smooth. WH, which I may take as the most perfect form of Γ, worked on that same principle as those old revisers. Professor Clark prefers the other principle, and I firmly believe that in a number of places his text has the highest probability, but in a much larger number of places Z admits needless, though perfectly good, insertions, which WH tacitly pass by. We must remember that WH admit a few readings of D as 'secondary,' *i.e.* having a reasonable chance of being true; and that in a larger number they admit readings of D as worthy of notice in the Appendix as having some special interest. These practically all are admitted in some form into the text of Z.

There is, however, another way of expressing the relation between Z and Γ, which is not stated by Mr. Clark. It was proposed by my friend Rev. E. Forse, of Trinity College, and of St. Catherine's, Southbourne, last winter. He convinced me, and I have found an exactly analogous case. In the composition of the *Acts*, St. Luke has left us two transcriptions: he may have made more. These were not separate editions: and one, perhaps both, were not intended to go forth to the public, as the Third Gospel was, without further change.

An analogous case is the History of Nicetas Akominatos of Chonai. He had the benefit of one or more eye-witnesses. Take,

e.g., his account of the last attack and crushing defeat of Manuel Comnenus in 1175. He wrote one version of his history and used many military terms and technical words. This he subsequently rewrote, changing, *e.g.* χάραγγας to χάρακας, using what was considered better Greek at that time and making an inferior history. He does not always understand his authority; but he in the authoritative version tries to re-express the story in high-class language. This has some value as an aid to comprehension of the first version, where he followed his authority more closely.

This theory is different from that of Blass, who tends to regard Z and Γ as two editions intended for circulation. The Gospel was 'published,' as I think about 80, and conveyed St. Luke's final draft. The *Acts* was still in hand when death interrupted. Luke was still seeking for perfect expression. Mr. Clark is so far right, that the final draft would have contained more traces of Z than have passed into WH's revision of Γ, and it must be noticed that WH admit in their text several variants as 'secondary,' *i.e.* as quite probably the true Lukan Text.

My object is to give some fair examples of both classes. A 'secondary' reading of WH resting on D is very probably true in a sense. Where WH suspect some 'primitive error,' and even resort to conjecture, or intimate that conjecture would be needed to attain a true text, Z has a supplement in some form or other, which fills the gap, and fills it in various cases so satisfactorily as to be probably correct and true Lukan text.

I do not introduce textual considerations, or comparison of MS authority. That would need a far longer article, and I am not the person to do it, not having done the preliminary work that would be required. I leave that to Canon Streeter and others, who are qualified. I speak only of internal evidence. Where is the text of Z or of Γ (*i.e.* WH) distinctly superior as a reasonable account of events? Professor Clark has established his case in a certain number of cases, but in most cases Z seems to me demonstrably inferior.

In xiv, 10 (the healing of the lame beggar at Lystra), the Editor might fairly argue that Paul's first words addressed to the man lying before him, must be what D affirms, 'I say unto thee in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ.' Only in the Name of Jesus must the Apostles ask all and do all. This was the first

direct miracle that Paul wrought, and here the formal mention of his appeal to the Name must be expected. The Jews who imitated Paul at Ephesus (xix, 13 f) tried to exorcise by using τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ; but the 5 στίχοι in 14 which the Editor prints as an important part of the true text are needless; and the text of Γ (as in WH) in xix, 13*f*, is shorter and better, for it states all the essential facts. The text of Z has nothing verbose; the 5 στίχοι are a good statement of the situation, summing it up in clear terms. Z is good, but Γ is better and quite complete.

As to the 5 στίχοι in Z (xix, 14, ἔθος εἶχαν κ.τ.λ.). they are a pure addition to the Γ text. Z gives Γ *almost* verbally, and this addition might fairly be taken as a marginal explanatory summary by some excellent glossator or commentator. The really important additions made by Z are those which give additional information beyond Γ.

The addition in xiv, 10, 'I say unto thee in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ,' are certainly the words which Paul used; and it may be said confidently that Luke's authority here is Paul himself. The only reason for dropping them is that they were a necessary and universal concomitant of Paul's and of all miracles. I cannot conceive that Luke himself omitted them. He got them from Paul's lips, and he would not add or omit anything Pauline. Here the theory is preferable that Γ resulted from the work of an excellent and learned and pious exegete, whose inclination was to drop all that could be safely omitted as implied in the context and the situation, along with all that was not quite certainly attested.

In xiv, 21, WH in their great Edition of the Γ text, admit to their text a 'secondary' reading which to me seems to be beyond doubt the true text: Paul and Barnabas from Derbe returned to Lystra and to Iconium and Antioch to confirm and establish their new churches, to appoint presbyteroi and to regulate the administration. Paul had the instinct of an organizer: he would not have a crude republican constitution, one man one vote, all of equal weight. The presbyteroi were not yet 'priests writ large,' but they certainly had much more weight in the councils of each congregation than the younger ordinary members.

On this second visit (*cf.* Gal. i, 9) Paul's style of address was, of course, much more 'pastoral' than on the first evangelizing visit. It is strange that, when discussing the authenticity of the so-called Pastorals, few scholars take into account that Paul was always pastoral to an already firmly-founded Church.

On the other hand in xiv, 10, *ἀνάστηθι ἐπι τοὺς πόδας σου ὀρθὸς καὶ περιπάτει*: the last two words in D and two allies are clearly wrong: Paul told the man to do what was suggested to Paul's own eyes. *περιπάτει* is added badly from xiv, 8. Paul could not know the need of that: he told the man in a loud voice to stand upright: the man sprang up (aorist) and began to walk (imp. tense). Again, *ὑπάρχων ἐν φόβῳ* is a bad addition of D and its allies: it can only mean that the man was one who *ἐφόβει τὸν θεόν* and was attracted to the Synagogue. This is in itself highly improbable, and detracts from the force of Paul's perception *ὅτι ἔχει πίστιν τοῦ σωθῆναι*. Paul acts in accordance with what he saw, not in accordance with the history of this unknown cripple beggar at the gates. The Editor rightly prefers *ἤκουσεν* to *ἤκουε*, which would imply that he was a regular listener, and suggest that Paul had been a considerable time in Lystra (compare the false reading of D in v. 7).

There seems very high probability that in xiv, 9, Z is right in inserting *διατριβόντων δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ διδασκόντων*, which Γ rejects. We must take into consideration the residence and work at Lystra, to which Luke evidently attached so great importance, for he devotes thirteen verses to two incidents there, *viz.* a miracle, an enthusiastic welcome, and a seeming miraculous recovery from death or prolonged unconsciousness.* Between these two incidents is interposed in Z the *στίχος* just quoted. Γ here places the two incidents side by side in the same paragraph, separated by a small space (which so far as I can judge means in WH only that there is a marked break).

We note also that *διδασκόντων* is the only intimation in Γ that Paul did any teaching in Lystra. That is assumed in Γ as obvious, but it is expressly stated in Z in a word. One must prefer Z.

* Incidents and residence at Antioch occupy 12½ verses, Iconium 5½, Derbe ½. The long sermon at Antioch was not peculiar to it, but states the method and teaching of Paul at all the four churches.

It seems to me evident that Paul met the lame beggar as he entered the gate of Lystra and was already beginning to discuss and to teach. Two strangers who did such a wonder were more easily taken by the crowd of natives (not of Roman coloni) for two of their gods, than two men who had resided for some time. Then came the change. Jews came from Antioch and Iconium, and the end was near. Some account of the intermediate period is supplied by D (probably rightly): this is much wanted, and we can hardly conceive Luke omitting to mention briefly the lapse of time and the course of work between the arrival of Paul in Lystra and the final scene.

Now look at the Apostolic Letter (xv, 23-29). The words are almost the same in Γ and in Z: the additions in Z, ἐξελθόντες and in 24 and εἰς πάντα πειρασμόν (an excellent emphasizing addition, but not beyond any good and careful reader to make: on the other hand its omission might be accidental). πνικτοῦ, Γ, is omitted in Z, and is in itself rather in need of apology, as it is explanatory. In a document like this, which purports to be quoted verbatim, exact agreement is to be expected, and most differences between Z and Γ are slight, and not beyond ordinary variations of MSS. But there is a significant addition in 29, καὶ ὅσα μὴ θέλετε ἑαυτοῖς γίνεσθαι ἑτέρῳ μὴ ποιεῖν: don't do to another, what you don't wish to be done to you: the Golden Rule applied in a negative form to suit the other prohibitions. Is this genuinely part of the decree of the first Christian Council? It is hardly above the level of commonplace moralizing, and is quite different in character from the other prohibitions, as everyone sees, and many commentators have discussed fully. At first sight one inclines to omit it as unworthy of its place. So WH do. But, when we compare *Gal.* ii, 7-12, our opinion changes. Paul had explained in A.D. 44 his Gospel to the Gentiles; and the leaders, James (so to say the 'Bishop' of Jerusalem) and Peter and John recognized the excellence of his teaching, welcomed him as their colleague, they to the Jews, he and Barnabas to the Gentiles, merely adding the advice 'only keep in memory the poor,' which (Paul adds with a touch of irony) was the very intention that had brought me to Jerusalem and had produced the interview with their Eminences. This solitary touch of positive advice at the

end is in the same goody-goody style of moralizing in A.D. 44 as the addition which Z makes to the Apostolic Letter in A.D. 50. Both those moral admonitions are genuine (one in *Gal.* ii, 12, in A.D. 44, one in *Acts* xv, 29, in A.D. 50. Both are the words of the same persons. In 50 we have Peter making the decisive speech after a long (and perhaps a little heated) discussion, and declaring in favour of the equality of Jew and Gentile in the sight of God : Barnabas and Paul describing the signs and marvels which God had wrought among the Gentiles : John absent or silent, as another voice was not needed (but it is now fashionable to say that he, like his brother, was dead) : James in the chair summing up in accordance with Peter : then the letter stating the Decree of the Council. The Decree is expressed after the same type as the verbal authorization that the same leaders had given to Paul and Barnabas six years ago, ending with a similar little touch of conventional morality, 'improving the occasion' (as was the phrase in Scotland when I was a boy).

Here Z is triumphant : the additional moral advice after the prohibitions was contained in the letter. The same reasons which have caused WH and many others to excise the addition, led that ancient exegete who cut down xiv, 10*a*, for a different reason, to cut out the appended moral advice here. I cannot imagine that Luke first inserted and then rejected the Golden Rule. He gave the letter verbatim. A later hand cut out the Rule.

It is worth noting that in xiv, 12, D has the form Δίαν. It is possible that this was the form used by the crowd of native 'Lustrenses' (to use the ethnic employed in an inscription), and that most of them were of the Phyle Hieros Thiasos, named in an inscription attached to a relief showing [Λυτήρ]ιος Ἀπόλλων performing lustration with a branch like a palm branch. I find ἐπιθύειν used near Antioch much as in xiv, 13. These give an Anatolian flavour to the scene. An exegete might have added them for that purpose later; but certainly Z is here far more Anatolian in expression than Γ.

Are we to understand from the silence of both Z and Γ about the appointment of presbyteroi in Derbe, that there were none appointed by Paul and Barnabas on this first visit? I would

rather suppose that μαθητεύσαντες ἱκανούς implies the preparation by higher training of at least a considerable, reasonable number so that they were fitted to be presbyters. μαθητεύσαντες implies a much more advanced stage than εὐαγγελίσαντες in hortatory work.

In my humble opinion the final revision of *Acts* was never made by Luke: in xvi, 19, 20, he says twice exactly the same thing: the ἄρχοντες are the στρατηγοί, two renderings of the duoviri of the Colonia (praetores). No writer could have intended to leave this doublet: a slight difference may be imported into the passage by the verbs, which express two moments in the action. There are many other passages where the expression is not final. In the inscriptions and coins archons and strategoi are synonymous.

It is a disadvantage to Z that Professor Clark questions some subsidiary principles that seemed to be established and admitted by general consent. He is not convinced that Luke was a physician, or that Luke wrote both the Third Gospel and the *Acts*. As to the first, I would add a further consideration. I am not sure whether it has been published either by any other or by myself; but I wrote to Harnack about it, and he after some days replied that it was the weightiest argument bearing on the point, and that it was conclusive. The other sick persons in Malta, xxviii, 9-10, used to come to 'us' and received medical treatment (ἐθεραπεύοντο). The Authorized Version has it 'they were healed.' The Revised Version 'they were cured.' The former is a clear mistranslation: the latter probably also. Luke draws a distinguishing line between the cases which Paul cured, and those which 'we' treated. The word is, as Harnack wrote after enquiry, the technical term in Greek medicine. Luke did what he as a physician could: he treated each case. That 'we' here means Luke himself is obvious. He was the only physician in the small party of three (xxvii, 2).

Here is the only reference that Luke makes to his own work personally, and how delicately it is veiled. Even Mr. Page in his excellent little edition does not observe it. It is hardly probable that the Revisers had this in mind; they apparently used 'cured' in its ordinary modern sense. A few weeks ago a very careful

doctor, who had healed me of pneumonia by his treatment, pronounced at the end the one word 'cured' in a tone of exultation. The Revisers used different words for the two Greek verbs *ἰάομαι* and *θεραπεύω*. If the Authorized translators had used 'cured' in the second case, one might have thought that they meant 'cured' in the sense 'taken care of,' which is now archaic.

Lystra was counted rather an Isawrian town than a Lycaonian, but Isawrian was practically the same language as Lycaonian, and Cicero calls the conventus that met at Iconium the Isawrican, and that which met at Philomelium the Lycaonian (though most modern scholars persist, defying Cicero's clear statements, in calling the Iconian conventus Lycaonia and slipping tacitly over Philomelium). Pliny confirms Cicero.

Here there is clear proof that all probability marks out Γ as true to the facts of the time and Z as false to the political situation. Z cannot be approved, but Γ has here the right Lukan text.

In the enumeration of the cities visited during this return journey, there is great variation. Mr. Clark reads *εἰς Λύστραν καὶ Ἰκόνιον καὶ Ἀντιόχειαν*. WH give a primary reading *εἰς τὴν Λύστραν καὶ εἰς Ἰκόνιον καὶ εἰς Ἀντιόχειαν*, and a secondary reading omitting the third *εἰς*. *τήν* before *Λύστραν* is what I was taught at school to call the article of second or repeated mention, *τὴν Λυστραν* in xiv, 21, 'Lystra which has just been mentioned.' Iconium and Antioch lie far back in history: Antioch in early October to December, A.D. 45, Iconium early 46, Lystra until harvest 46 brought Jews to buy up the excellent harvest of 46, probably when it was still half-grown or unreaped (for those poor cultivators could not live out of the capital which they had expended in sowing, and Jewish traders, rich speculators, bought it early and cheap), *i.e.* May and June 46. The residence in Derbe was during winter 46-47 : the return journey April 47 A.D.

In xiv, 21, Z enumerates the three cities on an equal footing. Γ distinguishes Lystra, as recently visited, by using the article; and the 'secondary' reading (which WH considered 'to have a reasonable probability of being true') groups Iconium and Antioch closely together by omitting *εἰς*. Professor Clark does not consider the authorities (which WH thought so good) to be worth mentioning even in a note. But *καὶ εἰς Ἰκονιον καὶ Ἀντιόχειαν*

makes those two a pair separated by some marked feature from Lystra: this feature was that Lystra was in Lycaonia, whereas Iconium and Antioch were in Phrygia. I need not repeat the many proofs from Xenophon to Cyprian and later which show that Iconium was in Phrygia, and that the frontier was between Iconium and Lystra. The difference was emphasized to Paul by change of language. In Iconium people spoke Greek and Phrygian: in Lystra they spoke Greek and Lycaonian. This he mentions in xiv, 11. He was sensitive to the change in speech.

As to the voyage along the Syrian coast in xx, Professor Clark follows Blass and makes Paul with his company go ashore at Ptolemais, and thence go by land to Jerusalem. Blass was a very great scholar; but among great German scholars there are many bad guides in travelling, and Blass is nearly the worst συνέκδημος of them all.

While in a few cases the longer text is distinctly preferable and Lukan, and in others the shorter, neither text is to be always preferred. Mr. Forse's theory, with the practice of Nicetas, is elastic and suits best. Γ as in WH is the best recension for the study of Luke as a writer.

Why is Luke so clear and definite in defining the village between Caesarea and Jerusalem where Paul stopped a night? Because Mnason was Luke's authority for certain marvels at an earlier time. Luke never quotes an authority; but he never leaves the attentive reader in doubt who was his authority. Why was Rhoda introduced in such a history as *Acts*? Because she alone could describe Rhoda's fluttering emotion when she heard Peter's voice. Luke had talked to Rhoda and heard her story. How does Luke know the inmost emotion in the Virgin's mind as she saw and heard the Angel come? Not because Luke was a master of the romantic novel, but because the Virgin had told him.

I may be permitted to mention my study of Paul's experiences at Antioch (towards Pisidia) in the light of excavations (see the *Guardian*, February—March, 1933). The situation of the Synagogue is certain, and this knowledge illumines xiii-xiv. Why does Luke not mention that Antioch was a colonia, and yet record carefully that Philippi had that rank? Because in xiii - xiv

Paul was the authority, and Luke would not add anything to Paul's words. But the distinction of classes, coloni and incolae, appears in Paul's narrative. At Philippi Luke was his own authority.

The true edition of Luke's work will never be made until it is made as a narrative of facts based on chronology. Paul and Luke are very careful in regard to chronology both in relation to surrounding Roman history, and to the lapse of years in the life of Paul: yet the times and the years are misunderstood or disregarded, or only partly regarded, in almost every modern study. The year, the season of the year, the month, once or twice even the day can be determined, and must be the framework of the story.

The problem reduces itself to three factors. (1) There are two Lukan texts of Acts: neither is the final text which Luke would have attained: generally Γ is the text which probably he was aiming at: sometimes Z is preferable, certainly the most useful for moderns, *e.g.* in xxi, 16, Z is the text needed to make Γ intelligible, for perhaps no one would ever have translated Γ rightly without the aid of Z, yet I share Scrivener's opinion that Γ is here elegant Greek (though Professor Clark does not agree in this opinion), and that Γ would probably have been Luke's final text.

(2) The third factor is a recension made soon after A.D. 323 by a learned scholar (or scholars), having access to the best MSS. available after many had been destroyed under Diocletian or Maximin, and desirous of making an authoritative text, every word of which was authentic, but preferring to reject in all doubtful cases.

Professor Clark's edition is most necessary and valuable, yet we cannot accept his main thesis. If all printed texts except two were destroyed, I would preserve Clark and WH.

WILLIAM MITCHELL RAMSAY.

TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF REALITY.*

'The inner quality of a religion,' Dr. Streeter writes in his Introduction, 'is known only to those who are, or who once were, its adherents; and even they can only communicate a little of it in words' (p. xi). My own ignorance of Buddhism, not merely in this respect, but in respect of the kind of knowledge an outsider may acquire, would make valueless an attempt to estimate these lectures as a contribution to the knowledge of Buddhism itself. Their main purpose was not to make such a contribution, though they contain many acute observations upon Buddhism, as Dr. Streeter has met with it in Ceylon, China, and Japan, and upon its history and sacred literature. Their purpose was the more immediately practical one of illustrating the distinctive character of Christianity by presenting it against the background of another great religion, and of drawing conclusions for the guidance of present thought and practice. The first lecture compares natural science and religion as ways of understanding the world. It is a satisfaction, though not a surprise, to find that whilst Dr. Streeter emphasizes the different interests underlying them, he gives no support to the view that they are so different that theology need pay no attention to what natural science knows of the world of nature. The second lecture compares the Buddha and the Christ. The next two discuss phases of the later development of each religion; the fifth is on Magic, Philosophy, and Religion; and the last three compare the two religions in their attitudes to pain, their moral aims, and their ideas of immortality. There is an Appendix on the idea of the holy, with a criticism of Rudolf Otto.

A comparison of two great religions must always be of interest, and it has as much interest for the student of history, or of economic and social life, as for the student of theology. The interest is peculiarly great when one of the religions is our own, and when both are studied as living faiths occupied with the present world, not merely as specimens from the past to be clas-

* *The Buddha and the Christ: an exploration of the meaning of the universe and of the purpose of human life.* (The Bampton Lectures for 1932. By Burnett Hilman Streeter. Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1932. Price 7/6.)

sified by the student. The comparison is especially valuable when many of the most confident critics of Christianity know little of it from within, and those ready with a simple reply, little of its past history. Amidst the assertion or denial of particular difficulties, the originality and achievement of Christianity, as a way of facing and understanding the world, are often forgotten. A study of Christianity in relation to another great religion brings its originality and greatness into relief, and shows how profoundly it permeates our whole civilization and our ways of thought. A reaction seldom succeeds in freeing itself from the dominating ideas of what it reacts against. Those most ready to criticize or reject Christianity do not recognize the extent to which Christianity has made both them and their criticisms. But, if Dr. Streeter's lectures are a defence of Christianity, they are a manifestation also of its continued vitality and power of growing to meet new situations: no living religion is a rigid framework of dogma into which new experience must be forced, or a refuge in which we may remain unconscious of its pressure.

The lectures are entitled 'The Buddha and the Christ.' Is it the Buddha, or Buddhism; the Christ, or Christianity? Neither historical person is important for us, or would be remembered, apart from the movement he initiated. But the Christ is more important, and better known, to the Christian than the Buddha is to the Buddhist. In neither case have we full knowledge of the origins. But, in the one, we have documents which can be dated as contemporary with the beginnings of the movement; while, in the other, the evidence is later and its dates uncertain, and this is the chief obstacle with which the student of the beginnings of Buddhism is faced. The difference is characteristic: it is due, not to the accidents of history, but to the characters of the religions and of the civilizations inseparable from them. To a people for whom the world is illusion, action has no value and history no meaning; why then preserve records of the past? Where records are preserved, and a historical person is more than the bearer of a doctrine, it is because action is felt to be valuable and the process of time to be full of meaning. This is the contrast which underlies all Dr. Streeter's comparison of the two religions. Nirvana may be peace, not utter annihilation; but it is won by the suppression of desire and by escape from the illusion

of the world. Buddhism is instructive because this doctrine is really believed and controls the life of those who accept it. The Christian too may seek a peace which cannot be taken from him; but he wins it by the manner in which he accepts the reality of the world and understands its meaning. Dr. Streeter's lectures are especially instructive because it is from this point of view, as attitudes to the world, that he compares the two religions. He criticizes Absolute Idealism very unfavourably, and says that it does not greatly differ from the prevalent Absolutism which Mahayana Buddhism derived from Indian philosophy (p. 170). But it is surely significant that European philosophies of this type have made a determined effort to explain the world of time and persons, of evil and error. The greatest attempt was Hegel's: that is the purpose and meaning of his Logic, which was intended to explain the fact of error and imperfection at least as much as to show how they may be overcome. Similarly, to describe Bradley's theory of 'degrees' as a back-door through which he smuggled in what his philosophy could not explain (p. 178) is surely to misconceive his intention: whether it be successful or not, this theory is the very centre of his philosophy.

The Buddhist and the Christian attitudes to the world determine their interpretations of suffering, their moral outlook, and their ideas of immortality. The later lectures, which deal with these questions, are perhaps the most interesting in the book. They are written with a lucidity and a power of exposition which make the reading of them as delightful as it is instructive.

J. S. Boys Smith.

THE BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIANITY.*

The publication of the last two volumes of Foakes Jackson's and Lake's *Acts* marks the completion of more than twenty years' labour, and is an event of great importance in the world of New Testament scholarship. In the past fifty years New Testament criticism has been concentrated on the Gospels, and there is still much to be done in that sphere; but the time has come for some advance into other fields. The Gospels reveal what the

* *The Beginnings of Christianity* (*Part I*). *The Acts of the Apostles*. Edited by F. J. Foakes Jackson, D.D., and Kirsopp Lake, D.D., D.Litt. Volumes IV and V, Commentary and Additional Notes. (Macmillan. 25/- each volume.)

Christians thought about Jesus in the latter half of the first century, but they shed little light on that mysterious period between the crucifixion and the time of St. Paul's literary activity. For that our only authority is the Acts of the Apostles, and the editors of *The Beginnings of Christianity* realized that no progress could be made in the reconstruction of the earliest period of Church History until an exhaustive study of Acts had been made. The first two volumes of Prolegomena and Criticism appeared in 1922; then in 1926 was published Professor Ropes's great work on the Text; and now after a further interval of seven years we have the long-expected Commentary, with a final volume of Additional Notes. It is obvious almost at a glance that the whole work will be indispensable for any serious study of Christian origins, and one may confidently predict that it will stand as a monument to contemporary scholarship long after the present generation has passed away.

In the preparation of these final volumes Dr. Foakes Jackson has taken no part, but it is pleasant to see that he writes a preface to Volume V, recalling the history of the work and congratulating the authors on its completion. The commentary is the joint work of Dr. Kirsopp Lake and of Dr. Henry Cadbury, who, as we learn from the preface, 'share the same general attitude towards the problems of New Testament criticism,' although Dr. Cadbury's interests are more specifically 'linguistic and literary,' while Dr. Lake's are 'doctrinal and historical.' No doubt the division of labour has its advantages on the principle that two heads are better than one; but it has its disadvantages also, and the critical reader is apt to find himself asking whether this or that challenging opinion is to be ascribed to Lake or Cadbury. There is some excuse for this wandering of the attention, because many of the notes are written in the first person singular. In such cases an initial at the end of the comment would surely have been helpful.

Dr. Lake in his preface regrets that it was not possible to reprint the Greek text at the top of the page, and his regret will certainly be shared by a very large number of his readers. It is most inconvenient to look up every reference in Volume III, or even to hold a copy of the Greek Testament open before one. Instead of the Greek text the editors print a translation. All

translations are subject to criticism, and this will prove no exception. To combine the dignity of the seventeenth century with the accuracy of the twentieth is perhaps impossible, and the first necessity is no doubt 'to explain as accurately as possible what the writer meant to say', but the rendering printed here will cause some shudders in those accustomed to the traditional English version. We would rather have had the Greek, with a translation where necessary in the notes. The notes are all on the Greek text, so that the translation tends to be neglected by the reader.

Considering how long a book *Acts* is, and how many are the difficulties in its interpretation, the authors are to be congratulated on having kept their commentary within reasonable bounds. Three hundred and fifty pages are not much for the translation and notes on twenty-eight chapters, even allowing for the fact that wider questions are treated in the dissertations in Vol. V. This brevity is partly to be explained by the fact that 'lengthy discussion of the opinion of other commentators has been deliberately omitted', and partly to the concise style in which the notes are written. Some notes are perhaps too short. Not infrequently a note consists of a single question which draws attention to a difficulty without attempting to explain it.

It is a feature of the commentary that many questions are left open, the authors being content to state the arguments on both sides and leave the reader to reach his own conclusions. Even in matters of textual criticism which are sure to loom large in any work on the *Acts* the authors maintain a detached attitude, and they are by no means bound by the opinions of the author of Vol. III.

Dr. Kirsopp Lake is frank as to his uncertainty:

> 'I do not feel quite so certain about the original text of *Acts* as do many critics, though in general we have accepted the position adopted by Professor Ropes in Vol. III that there are rather more cases where the Neutral Text explains the Western than *vice versa*, and that, judged by our standards, the Neutral generally seems intrinsically better. But this is not always true, and I am not sure about the validity of our standards, so that I am glad to have the opportunity of confessing that after fifteen years I am more often doubtful about the true text than I was before. The notes, therefore, provide a rendering of the Western Text of rather more passages than most readers will think desirable' (Preface, Vol. IV).

This impartial attitude characterizes the commentary as a whole, and it will perhaps reassure those who felt that the first two

volumes represented a somewhat extreme critical standpoint. In some respects the commentary will be welcomed by those who favour conservative views. For instance, on the crucial question of the authorship of the opening chapters, Dr. Lake rejects Loisy's theory of a late romance :

> 'The narrative gives an account of the Christians in Jerusalem, which, judged by the standards of the time when it was written, is intelligible and probable . . . It might just as well be the work of Luke as of a later editor.'
>
> 'It is in general the earlier views about Jesus which are given first in *Acts*. This seems to point to an historical basis in the Lucan presentation, in spite of editorial colour, sketchiness of statement, and many unhistorical details' (Vol. IV, p. 155).

With this we may compare a note on Peter's intervention in Samaria (*Acts* viii, 14 ff) :

> 'Too much criticism is vitiated by the fact that the critic cannot understand that the basis of the life of the early Church was its belief in its own supernatural power. He may be right, but neither the writer of *Acts* nor any early Christian would have agreed with him ; and to understand any book it is first necessary to assume the position of the writer, even if it be wrong.'

There we have the distinguishing feature of modern New Testament criticism as compared with that of thirty or forty years ago. Then there was a tendency to draw a picture of the early Church acceptable to modern rationalism ; now it is realized that such a picture must be wholly unhistorical. But whether conservatives are justified in exulting over the defeat of 'Liberal Protestantism' as they do may perhaps be doubted. If the supernaturalism of the Church of the first century be granted, it is not easier but harder to maintain our continuity with the Church of early days. Dr. Lake may say, 'In view of modern tendencies to regard Christianity as a wholly ethical movement, it is well to emphasize how much stress Luke puts on the miraculous power of the Apostles ; nor is this Lucan, it is early Christian' ; but is it Christian in any modern sense? and if not, does Christianity mean at all the same thing to-day as it meant in the first century?

It is impossible to refer in any detail to the notes of the commentary. They are brief, readable, scholarly, and they betray an understanding of the mind of the early Church which only a thorough knowledge of recent criticism could make possible. *Obiter dicta* are frequently valuable, such as the remark on p. 152, that

> 'the date of I *Clement* is by no means so certain as is

often assumed. The only serious reason for dating it in 96 is that it is thought to refer to the persecution of Domitian; . . . it would fit equally well some other period of persecution.'

How many chapters of early Church history will have to be rewritten if that remark receives the notice it deserves! And is this the first time that it has been noticed, with reference to the statement of the Fourth Gospel that the crowds who accompanied the Lord into Jerusalem cut down palm branches to strew in the way, that palms do not grow in Jerusalem *nor in Ephesus*, but they do grow in Alexandria?

Perhaps it is to the fifth volume that the attention of students will be most eagerly directed. Here the editors have invited the assistance of half-a-dozen other scholars, although Dr. Lake and Dr. Cadbury are responsible for the greater part of the volume. Thus Dr. Lake has notes on the Galilean Tradition of the Resurrection Appearances, the Ascension, the Death of Judas, and many more; Dr. Cadbury writes on the Speeches in *Acts*, on the Hellenists, and a very interesting note on 'using helps.' Dr. Casey and Mr. Knock write on Simon Magus; Miss Lily Ross on various subjects of classical archaeology; and there are others. In such a wealth of learning it is invidious to single out particular articles for special mention, and hardly one can be neglected by future writers; but we found the greatest interest in Lake's two articles on 'The Twelve and the Apostles in *Acts*' and 'Paul's Route in Asia Minor,' and in Dr. Vincent Scraumzza's investigation of the policy of the early Roman Emperors towards Judaism.

To pick out a few points:

'The fictitious nature of the *Didache* is often overlooked, and the fact that it is not intended by the writer to be a description of his own time — a date more uncertain than most writings on the subject suggest — but a picture of the days when the disciples of Jesus were still alive. For myself I think that the *Didache* in its present form is later than Hermas' (Lake, p. 51).

'My own impression is that the author of *Acts*, for all his attention to lines of development, has nevertheless not attempted to portray a consistent picture of an originally Jewish and Judaean Christianity systematically expanding to other lands and groups by definite intervening steps, but rather to emphasize the acceptance of the Gospel by non-Jews as a repeated phenomenon, which gradually broke down all opposition, not as one event which had one single beginning.'

So writes Dr. Cadbury on p. 67 in the course of a most valuable note on the meaning of 'Hellenists'; he sums up in favour of

the translation 'Greeks,' and thinks that there is no difficulty in supposing that *Acts* vi, 1, may have introduced a story in which Jews and Gentiles already formed the national divisions of the Jerusalem Church.

Undoubtedly one of the most important chapters is that of Dr. Kirsopp Lake on 'The Holy Spirit,' though not all will agree with his initial discounting of the belief in direct inspiration;

> 'There have always been leaders of men, reformers, teachers, poets, and prophets, who seem to themselves to have spoken and acted as they did because some higher power controlled their words and deeds. It used to be said that they were inspired by God; it is now thought that, like the demoniacs, they can be explained as the result of some unusual development of mind and nature.'

No doubt, but are the two theories mutually exclusive? Some of us would rather believe the great spiritual leaders of the human race when they claim to speak the oracles of the Lord than class them with the demoniacs.

These books cost money to buy and time to read them, but both will be wisely expended. No reader will approve of every word they contain. Some, like the present reviewer, will regret to see Dr. Kirsopp Lake led away by Professor Burkitt from acceptance of the Galilean tradition of the resurrection appearances. Some will shudder at such phrases as 'orientating investigation' which appears on p. 31. Others will note that the proof reading seems to have been entrusted to someone who was not much at home in Hebrew pointing. But these are minor matters. The great thing is that the editors have at last given us a study of *Acts* which embodies the results of the most recent research in the widest fields. Even yet it is too early to ask the question: How much do we really know about Christian Beginnings? There is no note for or against the historicity of the Lucan account, and what Kirsopp Lake says at the end of his discussion of Pentecost might be said of wider questions raised by *Acts*; 'In the end we appeal to probability and to preconceived ideas as to what may or may not have happened.' But how seldom has the subjective element in even the most scholarly criticism been so frankly acknowledged! The value of this most important critical work published since the war is in no way diminished by the authors' candour.

P. GARDNER-SMITH.

EIGHTY YEARS OF ENGLISH RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.*

It is not usual to review the books of one's intimate friends. In the present case — though for years Dr. Webb and I have discussed together nearly every problem that has occurred to either of us — I do not think that the ordinary objections arise: since I am sure that I should have said about this book almost exactly what I am going to say now, even if I had never heard of Dr. Webb before.

The book contains lectures delivered last year in the University of Upsala. It makes easy reading for the same reason for which Dr. Webb's short *History of Philosophy* (in the Home University Library) made easy reading. Both books are written for those for whom (though on quite different grounds) full and detailed explanation was necessary.

Though Dr. Webb's primary purpose here is to 'narrate a history,'[1] the book is, of course, far from being a mere chronicle. It contains much careful study of the ideas that have guided the history. It contains also some very interesting advice to the 'theologian of to-morrow.'[2]

Dr. Webb describes, in vivid sketches, some of the men and movements that have brought about the changes which have made English religion in 1933 something very different from English religion in 1850. Of special interest is Dr. Webb's quotation from Colenso's preface[3] to his work on the Pentateuch — a work which probably very few of us have ever read. The quotation fully justifies the statement that the Editor of *Lux Mundi* 'reaffirmed the doctrine that had been Colenso's.'[4] The two, as Dr. Webb says, were 'quite similar assertions.' Their different reception teaches a lesson which even now perhaps we have not all of us fully learned.

The story, as Dr. Webb reads it, turns chiefly round the words 'transcendence' and 'immanence.' Religious thought in England has moved from the 'older Theism'[5] — the belief in a

* *A Study of Religious Thought in England from 1850.* By Dr. Clement C. J. S. Webb. (Oxford University Press. 1933. Price 8/6.)

[1] p. 141. [2] pp. 55, 167. [3] p. 75.
[4] p. 74. [5] p. 14.

'transcendent God,' a God 'outside of Whose essential being the world-process itself fell'[6] — towards Immanentism. It is now beginning to move back again: to lay stress upon 'precisely those factors in religious experience[7] which a theology of immanence is tempted to neglect.'

This Immanentism has itself 'taken more than one form.'[8] The book should help us — and this is surely a very useful service — to disentangle the various problems (often somewhat subtly intertwined) which the words 'immanence' and 'transcendence' suggest to various minds.

If we catechised our neighbours, we should find, I think, that for most of them, if they use the word at all, 'immanence' means just one thing. 'English immanentism[9] has been primarily the thought of God's immanence in nature.' His immanence in history and civilization has been less prominent. For those who disliked the thought of a 'transcendent Creator[10] who designed, after the manner of a human mechanician, the wonderful adaptation to their circumstances and environment which is evinced by the structure of organic beings' (what has been called the 'Almighty Watchmaker' of Paley), the poetry of Wordsworth — with its 'sense sublime'

> Of something far more deeply interfused.
> . . . . . .
> A motion and a spirit that impels
> All thinking things, all objects of all thought, etc.

— was a Godsend. It saved for them a theism they would otherwise have abandoned.

But if Immanentism is taken in the wide sense in which Dr. Webb himself uses it, then — however much it may be shown in the end to be a single movement of thought or feeling — it covers a number of tendencies which are at least *prima facie* distinct: and here a certain disentanglement seems urgently necessary.

The following are some of the questions which, in the changes of opinion which Dr. Webb describes, have been answered in opposite ways. Is the modern Christian to speak with St. Paul of 'this present evil world' from which religion 'delivers' us?[11] Is civilization good, bad, or religiously unimportant?[12] Is the

[6] p. 80. [7] p. 10. [8] p. 44.
[9] p. 35. [10] p. 36. [11] *Galatians* i, 4.
[12] pp. 28, 29, etc.

individual of value for his own sake, or merely in his place in the Whole, or again, merely as the expression of a principle that might have been embodied otherwise?[13] Have moral distinctions an ultimate metaphysical validity?[14] Is divine transcendence necessary to guard us against the Pantheism for which everything *equally* is a manifestation of God — or for which 'things in their finitude,' or 'things as an aggregate,' are equivalent with God? Is divine transcendence necessary for such 'distinction between the worshipper and his God'[15] as religion and morality demand? The Moral Law is something *above* us which we reverence. The object of knowledge is something prior to the act of knowledge — discovered by that act and not created in it. In what sense is a doctrine of transcendence necessary to ensure the validity of knowledge and the claims of morality: or, again, to support the Doctrine of Grace — the anti-Pelagian attitude characteristic of Christianity equally in its Catholic and Evangelical forms? How many of these questions depend for their answer upon the question already mentioned, Do we believe in a God 'outside of whose essential being the world-process itself falls'?[16]

Further, whether we regard the world-process as existing within God or outside Him, there remains the entirely separate question of what the world-process itself contains. Is 'Nature' the same as the Universe? Are there any 'finite things' beyond that present order of Nature which is studied by history and natural science? Have miracles ever broken in upon that order? Is there a 'future life'? For a life after death (whether we take it to involve a bodily resurrection or not) it seems clear that the present order of nature makes no provision. Dr. Webb knows the importance of the question of the future life. But, if this is an important question, so equally is the question of what he calls 'inferential theology.'[17] We can hardly claim to have 'immediate knowledge' of the future life. If we are to know anything about it at all, by way either of affirmation or denial, that knowledge must somehow be reached by inference. It would be

[13] *Cf.* p. 68. The unity of the world only comes to full fruition—is only perceived, understood and enjoyed—by conscious beings. Thus, in a sense, the Whole seems to exist for the Individual, rather than the Individual for the Whole.

[14] p. 43. [15] p. 37. [16] p. 80. [17] p. 140.

interesting to know whether the 'discontent' aroused by the inferential methods of the eighteenth century divines — and the reaction against them has lasted to this day — is primarily provoked by the inferential method itself or by the doctrine of divine transcendence which was assumed to be bound up with it.

Now all studies of reactions and counter-reactions convey to us the warning to *beware* of reactions, to beware of being carried away by them. The 'moral' of the facts here narrated may be summed up in the words 'Try the spirits.' 'Distinguish the various factors and elements in the present reaction against Immanentism, and judge each on its merits.' 'Why,' asked Bishop Gore, 'should we be always in reaction?' The leaders of this present reaction are, as we all know, doing good work, especially in the field of New Testament study. It is because in their school the spirit of reaction seems to me to be too whole-hearted, too indiscriminating, that I earnestly commend to them and their disciples a study of Dr. Webb's pages.

There is one point, at any rate, at which it seems clear that religion must preserve its immanentist attitude. Granted that immanentism has been too much mixed up with a purely world-affirming ethic, with a too great complacency towards Western civilization, with a sentimental Christology for which Jesus was little more than the prophet of modern philanthropy and culture, it may still be true that Christian theism, if thought out, will be found to imply 'such an immanence of the Divine Being in everything that is real as is suggested by Spinoza's saying, *Quicquid est in Deo est*.'[18] Christianity, says Dr. Webb, 'cannot compromise its fundamental monotheism by allowing that there is any reality in which God is *not* immanent, any realtiy which, in the last resort, can claim to exist independently of His immanence therein.'[19] He goes on to speak explicitly of 'things evil.'

That religion is never contented to think of God as simply a knowing and willing Being 'outside of Whom the world-process falls,' seems to become clearer the more closely one observes one's own religion and other people's. Religion never speaks of God as *under* the laws of morality or of thought (and yet, if He merely knew them and willed according to them, this is just what He would be), still less as 'laying down' those laws by an

[18] p. 166.

[19] p. 168; *cf.* p. 39.

arbitrary act of will. We think of them rather as part of His nature. He not merely enjoins love : He *is* love. But, if He includes within His own nature the necessary laws of all kinds which He knows, then He includes within Himself the whole world-process which follows from those laws — the world which the love which He *is* has constrained Him to create — so that it is 'in Him that we live and move and have our being.' If God and the world were mutually exclusive — if God were merely a conscious being with thoughts and volitions, whose volitions were one thing and their fulfilment another[20] — then, beside our gratitude to God for His gracious will, we should owe gratitude also to whatever it is in the constitution of the Universe which brings it about that these gracious desires are fulfilled. Such divided gratitude is plainly repugnant to the spirit of religion. Thus, though in teaching 'the unity immanent in all the infinitely various forms of being'[21] men often forgot 'what should have been borne in mind,' and so justified in advance the reaction which is recalling those forgotten truths, nothing can justify a doctrine of transcendence which puts the world process outside of God.

It is not irrelevant here to point out that there is another angle from which this whole story of reaction and counter-reaction may be looked at. Mr. F. R. Barry, in a book that has deserved its great popularity, falls foul of the famous nineteenth century distinction between 'fact' and 'value.' For him it is the 'lie in the modern philosophic soul.'[22] And, doubtless, if Mr. Barry wants merely to insist that the 'real facts'[23] are not 'morally and aesthetically neutral,' and that the values are not merely 'imposed upon them by us,' his strong language is justified. Again, if the 'divorce'[24] between fact and value means an assertion that values and facts have nothing to do with one another, and belong to quite separate worlds, such an assertion is not only a denial of the faith which St. Thomas expresses by saying

[20] The popular argument that 'an ordered system can only be ordered by a mind : that the world is an ordered system : therefore, etc.,' illustrates the difficulty of this sort of doctrine of transcendence. The mind of God is itself an ordered system, which (on this reasoning) demands another Mind to order it, and so on *ad infinitum*.

[21] p. 168. [22] *The Relevance of Christianity*, p. 113.

[23] *Op. cit.*, p. 183. [24] p. 113.

that the perfection of the Universe is God's chief aim in creation : it would forbid us to expect even the realization of aesthetic values in Nature.

But here we must distinguish. The antithesis in the form in which it dominated much of the thought of the last century has its origin in Kant. When Kant said that 'even the Holy One of the Gospels must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before we can recognize Him as such,'[25] the distinction between fact and value which was afterwards worked out by others is already implicity present. The pastoral value of this distinction is great. Dr. Webb tells[26] the well-known story of George Eliot's conversation with Frederic Myers. There are in our parishes still men 'of nineteenth century mind' to whom Duty is much clearer than God. If they are tempted to ask Mr. Barry's question, 'Why shouldn't I?'[27]—'Why shouldn't I exploit, commercially or sexually, the innocence of my neighbour?' —it is much more easy to convince them of their neighbour's value as a moral being than to show them that God loves him or that Christ died for him, or that these statements, even if true, are relevant.

'At the first preaching of the Gospel'—so the critics of Liberalism are saying—'the Gentile world was saved, not by "the Christian ethic," not by the "character of Jesus," not by the simple proclamation of the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man, but by just that which Ritschl thought most useless—a "narrative of the great deeds done by God."[28] God had sent His Son to die and rise again for us. This was the message that gathered men together "to wait for God's Son from Heaven."'[29] 'The same Gospel,' they add, 'which saved one distracted generation may save another. The world, which has outgrown Ritschl and Harnack, may still be brought to God by Karl Barth.'

In all this there is something true. Part of the effect of the Gospel *was* due to its objective and narrative form : and just so far as we ourselves believe it in that form we may bring others

[25] *Grundlegung*, Section II.
[26] p. 183.
[27] *The Relevance of Christianity*, p. 1.
[28] See *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, Vol. III, paragraph 6.
[29] *I Thess.* i, 10.

to our own faith. The story of 'the goodness of God' will still 'lead men to repentance.'[30] Yet, after all, it was an ethical conviction that was decisive even in the first age. 'They argued not, but preached: and conscience did the rest.' Are we then to refuse to call men 'everywhere to repent' because we find some men constitutionally suspicious of supernatural narrative? It is, surely, a mysterious dispensation of Providence that the indiscriminating reaction against everything Liberal should have begun before the great pastoral lesson of Liberalism has been fully learned. Here again we must try the spirits. Is this indiscriminating reaction wholly 'of God'?

Dr. Webb draws attention to another and very different issue on which again discrimination is necessary. One of the most stubborn reactions of the nineteenth century, the reaction against 'teleology' and 'inferential theology' in general, has not yet been followed by its counter-reaction. For Spengler, though perhaps his own doctrine of Destiny is more 'teleological' than he suspects, teleology is 'that nonsense of all nonsenses within science.'[31]

Let us admit that God is not known wholly or mainly through inference. Apart from the great mystics, there are the many who know God primarily through the accusing voice of the Holy Spirit within them, who recognize the 'evident authority' of this accusation, and are sure directly—or at least without conscious inference—that they are in contact here with an inexhaustible source of guidance and strength. There are those who, like Martineau,[32] hold that 'in the act of conscience we are immediately introduced to a Higher than ourselves that gives us what we feel'—one to whom we owe the reverence which 'can only rightly be felt for a person.' But to turn *from* the world to find refuge 'in the secret places' with a God thus conceived is not the same thing as to see God ruling in the world itself. Thus, when Professor Cook Wilson says 'We don't want merely inferred friends. Could we possibly be satisfied with an inferred God?'[33]—when Dr. Webb complains that inferential theology does not justify that personal communion with God which reli-

[30] *Romans* ii, 4. [31] *Decline of the West*, Eng. tr., pp. 120-121.
[32] *Religious Thought in England*, etc., pp. 127-8.
[33] *Statement and Inference*, p. 853.

gion requires — I agree that with merely inferential knowledge I should not be *satisfied*. At the same time I am not satisfied with a theology which has nothing to say about the divine government of the world. But if our theism is to include the belief that God 'numbers the hairs of our heads'[34] and 'rules in the kingdom of men,'[35] I do not see how these beliefs can be established, or defended against the obvious objections that can be made, except by some variant of the old-fashioned arguments. I dislike, as much as anyone can, the form in which these arguments have sometimes been presented. But they have carried weight in the classical ages of philosophic thinking: with the Greeks, with the Schoolmen, as well as in the eighteenth century. Even Kant criticized them with respect. In treating them as 'nonsense' the last hundred years have been 'out of step' with the rest of thinking mankind. I know that, in moments when I have feared that my direct sense of the divine support might perhaps be an illusion, I have gone back to the familiar reasonings with gratitude and have found renewal of faith. It was, after all, an *inference*, based on the sight of a tree in winter, which gave to the author of *The Practice of the Presence of God* that first decisive impulse which never spent its force.

Many years ago Dr. Webb described a certain school of piety, whom he nevertheless admired, as 'expecting immediate knowledge where mediation is necessary.' He has probably forgotten the phrase, but he still holds, of course, that mediation has its place in religion. He connects the 'fundamental monotheism' of Christianity with the 'ambitious enterprise of the Hegelian logic.'[36] The Hegelian arguments are very different from the arguments of Paley: but still they are *arguments*. It is '*Spirit itself* which gives itself a presupposition in Nature':[37] but still God does reveal Himself in Nature first of all,[38] and the knowledge of God is mediated through the long chain of the categories. Much that Hegel taught is true and profound, even if it can be shown not to follow from the Logic. But the Logic is still (as Dr. Webb implies) the starting-point of Hegelian study. What did Hegel *think* that the Logic had proved? We must answer this question plainly before we can judge of his

[34] *Matt.* x, 30. [35] *Daniel* iv, 17. [36] p. 166.
[37] *Lesser Logic*, § 239. [38] Do., § 140.

success. But do we not, most of us, exaggerate the difficulty of this judgment? If we can agree, first of all, what the different categories mean — and in the case of some of them (Being, Quality, Quantity, Essence, Ground) Hegel's meaning is pretty obvious—if, further, we can agree what the process of the Logic is supposed to be,[39] *how* each category passes into its opposite, *how* and *why* the contradiction thus developed demands its solution in a further category — we ought to be able to agree about what is required of the Logic at each transition, whether the transitions must change in character as the Logic advances,[40] what at each point is the 'working contradiction by which each category passes into its successor.'[41] We can then answer the question, Are there any weak links or no?[42] Those who hold, with Professor Cook Wilson, that the 'conception of God can only be realized by us with certain emotions,' that here reason and feeling are 'inseparable,' so that 'we cannot judge except emotionally,'[43] will reply that, even if no link is missing from the chain, there is something in God which this process of seeing and resolving contradictions cannot reveal to us. This reply is at least in harmony with Dr. Webb's advice[44] to us to do 'equal justice to the self-existent Reality apart from which "religious experience" is no revelation of God' *and* to the religious experience itself apart from which God 'must remain for ever unrevealed.'

Now the theologian is probably as much in earnest about the ultimate problems as anybody in the modern world. He knows the seriousness of the issues. Thus one may hope that neither this explicit advice, nor the warning to beware of one-sidedness in general which is implicit in this whole history, will be addressed to him in vain.

CHARLES J. SHEBBEARE.

[39] See especially Dr. Ellis McTaggart's *Commentary on Hegel's Logic*, pp. 4, 6, 220. 'What is the subject-matter to which the whole dialectic applies?' *Cf.* Kuno Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern philosophie* (edition of 1911), Vol. VIII, pp. 433-448.

[40] *Lesser Logic*, § 240.

[41] I think the phrase was Dr. Bosanquet's. How far will the formula carry us, 'Whatever is thought under *A* must also be thought under not-*A*: therefore under *B*, which unites them'?

[42] See the concluding paper in the *Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy* (held at Oxford in 1930).

[43] *Statement and Inference*, pp. 859, 860.

[44] p. 169.

BASAL FORMS OF PERSONAL RELIGION.*

The late Archbishop of Upsala has been described as a prince of the Church, and indeed, he combined so many qualities and activities of a princely character that he will pass down to history as one of the greatest of prelates. He was a prince among scholars and among theologians, a prince in pastoral care and administrative capacity, a prince among peace-makers in Europe. But seldom has a student, who devoted so many years to dry research into the language, anthropology and history of Oriental religions, and African and Australian cults, preserved so glowing an evangelical zeal for his clergy and people, and made time for the organization of so remarkable an international gathering as the Stockholm Conference.

All this comes out in Dr. Brilioth's introductory memoir, as clearly as the intellectual vigour, and firm strength of character, depicted in the photograph which precedes it. The book itself contains Söderblom's Gifford Lectures, delivered in Edinburgh in 1931, which were devoted to an investigation of the 'basal forms of personal religion.' That is the attractive sub-title of this work, but before we pass through it in review, two main points deserve notice. Firstly, we have here a masterly study in comparative religion, which experts will read with pleasure. Secondly, Söderblom ranks with Von Hügel, Karl Barth and Karl Heim in stressing the objective nature of the being of God, and religious faith as *given* by God. No criticism will be able to allege that his conclusions are not based upon knowledge, upon deep reflection, and upon a rational correlation of facts and ideas, for if Söderblom asserts consistently that man cannot find God, and that God must find man, his conclusion is the more weighty because of the comprehensive and thoughtful enquiry which precedes it. Here is the true liberalism, a liberalism not content with testing theories by research and experience, but a liberalism open and ready to adopt a conclusion to which the facts do not always lead, simply because they can go no farther, but which they sometimes inevitably forecast as the true goal of

* *The Living God.* By Nathan Söderblom. With a Biographical Introduction by Dr. Yngve Brilioth. (Oxford University Press. 1933. 18/-.)

the journey. Söderblom finds faith in God possessed by man all over the world, at all stages and in all ages of human development, but that faith, he maintains, is not developed by the unaided power of human thought or aspiration. It is given by God to the seeker after God, and on this ground only can the loftiest phenomena of religious experience be explained.

The first lecture, with its supplement, is devoted to a survey of primitive types of religious sentiment and practice. Religion appears in the individual before it occupies the attention of the community. 'The idea that the mass or the community is the original subject of religion belongs to that modern scientific mythology which is in process of disappearing.' Primitive peoples possess a consciousness of divine action, and the pious or religious man is one to whom something is holy, and to this he bows in submission and trust. On the other hand, the essence of magic is 'an audacious self-glorification.' Thus magic is in direct opposition to the spirit of religion, even in primitive peoples. Eight lectures are then occupied with the discussion of various types of religion, some more, some less developed. In the sections on Hinduism and Buddhism we are reminded of Mr. Tambyah's *Foregleams of God* (Luzac, 1925). From the point of view of 'religion as method,' especially in the Yoga, or ascetic systems of India, Söderblom finds little room for the conception of God, or for devotion to God, on the ground that method cannot impart faith. 'The faith gained by self-suggestion has no value. Faith must be given . . .' it is 'unattainable by man himself.' But the complementary truth is not neglected, 'man draws nigh to God and gets to know the divine by faith and thought. Faith and thought are the approach of man to God.' So he breaks away from the 'either—or' of modern dialectic, and adopts the 'both—and' which is the true dialectical process. Love in man, he says, is the answering echo of the love which first loved us. 'Faith lays hold of God or, rather, faith is laid hold of by God.' He throws out the cogent warning that the mystical experience of 'bliss of seeing,' or ecstacy, yields no deeper knowledge of God.

'Religion as psychology' has long been known in Jinism and Hinayana Buddhism, but it offers no more than a religion of salvation by knowledge. Revelation, which is one of Söder-

blom's keynotes, is not heard in Buddhism. Loftier heights are reached by 'religion as devotion' in the history of Hinduism. Long before it was in touch with Christianity, ideas of faith, devotion and love towards a living personal deity or saviour were prevalent. The recognition was made that after all his efforts, man is powerless to reach the highest faith and salvation. The practical effect of this idea was that morality was transformed, in the Bhakti system, from ascetic exercise into worship; and work is transformed into a means of acquiring perfection. Work is not to be shunned or deserted, it is to be done for God's sake. 'Nowhere else in India do we meet as here the living God . . . God has made Himself known. He comes to man.' We need not hesitate to accept Dr. Appasamy's conclusions in *Christianity as Bhakti Marga* (Macmillan 1927). Bhakti is no mere sentimentalizing on the part of the piety of devotion, since the function of knowledge is allowed for, but it does emphasize what is the common experience of every successful evangelist — faith and salvation can be gained without knowledge in the strict sense. In Buddhism similar ideas are to be found. Salvation is by faith, not by works. The Lutheran evangel was being taught in India centuries before it was heard in Europe.

In the teaching of Zarathushtra religion assumes the rôle of 'a fight against evil,' and the idea of revelation becomes more distinct. God revealed Himself 'as the protector and upholder of right, goodness and fidelity.' As in the Psalms, piety is largely a struggle against troublesome adversaries. The influence of Barthian thought is again unmistakeable at this point in Söderblom's book. 'Religion is concerned with an "I," but also with a "Thou."' God is the subject in the religious dialogue with the soul of man. Passing from Iranian conceptions, Söderblom traces in the teaching of Socrates 'the religion of a good conscience.' But Socrates is in the line of Moses and Zarathushtra, who were the mediums of revelation. His *daimonion* was the instrument of the divine voice in the soul of Socrates. Certainly no hysteric, but a rationalist, although penetrated by a trust in God, Socrates set up conscience as the criterion of religious truth.

In the lecture on 'religion as revelation in history' we hear many of the leading tones of the Barthian orchestra, although

Barth's name is never mentioned. 'On comparing it with the other great documents of religion . . . nothing is more striking than the fact that piety in the Bible is never mere psychology — never monologue in the proper sense, never philosophical discourses — but drama. The Bible is never content with merely describing the state of the soul . . . the psalmist . . . exhorts his distressed soul to hope in God.' Elijah hears the word of the Lord as a word of revelation. 'God Himself is the everlasting *Yes* in existence.' This *Yes* the prophets hear, and everyone must hear it, otherwise the *No* which checks moral temptation will be useless. In the Bible, history is invested with an entirely new significance, because God comes very close to the prophets, who were not satisfied with a mere religious interpretation of history, but fastened upon particular deeds — the delivery from Egypt, Sinai, the conquest of Canaan — as deeds performed by God for the salvation of Israel. 'Man should not think he can know everything. Existence is at bottom super-rational . . .the religion of revelation was consummated not in a perfect doctrine or guide to salvation but in a person.' So he passes easily to the lecture on 'religion as Incarnation.'

'The real centre, the real law, the real institution and organization of Christendom and the Church is a living personality, it is the incarnate Son, the risen Lord, who is known from His life and work on earth, and whose activity is developed by the Holy Spirit. Christ Himself, the Word made flesh, is the centre of Christian fellowship.'

'This new amazing fact . . . is the *uniqueness of Christ*, as historic person and revealer of God, and the *supernatural character of the divine revelation* through the prophets and through Christ. The eternal reason and will of God, the *Logos*, became very flesh. This view of the Church in no way denies God's general revelation to mankind before and outside of Christianity.' Good Friday observance testifies 'to the unique character of Christianity as revelation in history. The substitution of the Fête de Dieu means a timeless worship of the divinity created or made visible by the consecration of the priest.' While doubtless man had been seeking after God, yet the 'cross is the strongest testimony that *God has been seeking man.*'

It is very seldom that a work which so closely pursues, with eyes bent to the ground, the trail of human progress in dim past ages, seeking it may be, only slight indications of an original idea about God native to man himself, and piecing them together into so consistent an account of human origins, ends on this triumphant Christian note. Nor does the final upward gaze cause Söderblom to forget that his feet are still upon the earth. His last lecture develops the theme that while God did reveal Himself once for all in Jesus Christ, yet the divine self-communication continues in nature, in history, in moral life. God reveals Himself in genius, and though he does not go so far as Brunner, who finds genius in every man, he is aware of the notion as it was expressed by Geijer. God's kingdom 'broke in' through the genius of Luther, and it continues so to break in through history, in contrast with the Thomist conception, which confines revelation to an institution and a theological system. Belief in revelation is an essential part of Christian theology, unique in Christ, but of varying degrees in history. Here is yet another modern voice, trained in its own school of comparative religion, but producing a note at the end, not usually heard in that auditorium, yet a note which a growing body of teachers to-day realises to be essential if the modern man is to be found again by God.

A. J. Macdonald.

THE NEW ENGLISH HYMNAL.*

The publication of the English Hymnal in 1906, with Dr. Percy Dearmer as General Editor and Dr. Vaughan Williams as Musical Editor, marked the dawn of a new era in hymnology. As the Preface stated it was not a 'party book,' but 'an attempt to combine in one volume the worthiest expressions of all that lies within the Christian creed, from those "ancient Fathers" who were the earliest hymn-writers, down to contemporary exponents of modern aspirations and ideals,' while in the selection of tunes 'no particular country, period, or school was exclusively drawn upon to supply material, but an attempt was made to in-

**The English Hymnal with Tunes.* New Music Edition, 1933. (Humphrey Milford. Oxford University Press. 6/-.)

clude the best specimens of every style.' Even though some might feel that the collection itself did not always actualize the ideals of the Preface, yet the comprehensive principle is now universally recognized as the basic principle for all further progress, and has been not the least important contributory factor towards domesticating the book in the Anglican Church.

The edition of 1933 is described as a 'New Music Edition.' The hymns themselves remain as they were in 1906, except that the text of Blake's 'Jerusalem' has been added at the beginning of the book, and 'a few words have been altered here and there at the request of the authors.' Such alterations are merely stylistic improvements. As previously, certain verses of lengthy hymns or of hymns with slow tunes are starred for omission, if desired. In this connection we note that 506 has the last verse:

> 'And all must love the human form
> In heathen, Turk, or Jew:
> Where Mercy, Love, and Pity dwell,
> There God is dwelling too.'

so marked.[1] The tune is not slow (=112), neither is the hymn long (five verses of C.M.). One hopes that the new departure is not due to any narrowing of outlook such as caused the German Nazi theological student when hearing,

> 'Ob Jud, ob Türk, ob Hottentott,
> Wir glauben all au einen Gott,'

to exclaim, 'That is Liberalism, that is all gone!'

On the musical side the book has been greatly enriched. No tune found in the 1906 edition has been omitted, but over a hundred tunes have been added, some of which are old ones discovered during the past twenty-five years, while others are the work of modern composers. This has been made possible by (*a*) the removal of duplicates and (*b*) the placing of certain tunes in the Appendix and by filling such vacancies with new tunes.

Those placed in the Appendix include W. H. Gladstone's 'Hammersmith' (Dear Lord and Father of mankind, 383), Dyke's 'St. Oswald' (Through the night of doubt and sorrow, 503) and Hayne's 'St. Cecilia' (Thy Kingdom come, O God, 554), which are replaced by Parry's 'Repton,' Martin Shaw's

[1] It is omitted entirely in Songs of Praise (Enlarged Edition, 1931).

'Marching' and a tune by William Boyce respectively. 'Cheerful' and 'Royal Oak' are two other excellent replacements. Among replacements of duplicates we may mention Harwood's 'Thornbury' (Thy hand, O God, has guided, 545[2]) and Thomas Wood's 'School House' (O Strength and Stay, 271).

Since 1906 more correct versions of certain tunes have been discovered, involving a slight alteration to the melody. This affects eleven tunes in all. Perhaps the most notable change is that at the beginning of the English Traditional Carol Melody 'Capel,' which now descends from the dominant to the mediant instead of rising from the tonic. In certain cases also the harmony has been slightly changed and the lower parts altered in detail.

It is in the Plainsong that the new edition is most radical. Entirely new accompaniments to all the Plainsong tunes, 96 in number, have been substituted by J. H. Arnold, and the system of barring has been revised in the light of the best texts obtainable. Mr. Arnold has also written an excellent new Preface as 'Plainsong Melodies,' dealing with 'Sources,' 'Execution' and 'Accompaniment.' The familiar accompaniments to 'Veni Emmanuel' and 'Veni Creator,' however, will be found in the Appendix.

Apart from the Plainsong, musically the book may be said to approximate to 'Songs of Praise.' Yet there is ample room for both books. Many will doubtless prefer the latter, as being both richer in music and less dogmatic in theology, while the same will apply to those who are unable, owing to lack of training or by nature, to appreciate Plainsong. But for those who admire a judicious blending of the best in the traditional music and verse of the Christian Church of all periods, it cannot be denied that Dr. Dearmer and Dr. Vaughan Williams have done a great work. The editors too deserve praise for the convenient manner in which they have executed their revision, in that both old and new editions can be used together. It is only to be regretted that a similar method was not adopted in the 1931 edition of 'Songs of Praise.' Was it really impossible?

H. F. Sparks.

[2] Misprinted in the General Index, p. 997, as 609.

ANGLO-CATHOLICISM AT THE CROSS-ROADS.*

At the time when the Kikuyu controversy raged most fiercely Dr. Hensley Henson, donning the robe of a prophet, entered the fray with the challenge to the Church of England *Quo Tendimus?* He rightly held that the fundamental issue involved in the controversy was not a question of ecclesiastical order, but rather the whole Anglican tradition of theological liberty.

> 'It is no matter of mere ceremonies, or even of formularies. These have been many in Christ's Church: they rise, and serve their purpose, and pass as the generations which framed them pass, never continuing in one stay, save as mummies in our theological museums. But the point of view—what shall it be? backward always to the receding past? or forward to the increasing future? A creed of Sterility, or a creed of Growth? a religion of the Letter, or of the Spirit? Phrase it how you will, that is the issue, as clearly presented to the Church of England to-day, as when St. Paul stood like a rock against St. Peter at Antioch. That was the issue of the Reformation, and our Fathers chose Freedom, with all its shadows and risks. May God, in His Mercy, grant us grace not to betray the trust we received from them, or lightly to cast aside the fruit of their hardly won victory!'

Writing nearly twenty years later, the authors of *The Development of Modern Catholicism*, though not displaying the enthusiasm for the Reformation so eloquently voiced by Dr. Henson, are no less clear as to the theological significance of the Kikuyu controversy, and mark with regret 'the willingness which it revealed among a large section of Anglo-Catholicism to welcome any defence of obscurantism that could be put forward with sufficient ingenuity.' Unfortunately the spirit which they deplore is still widely prevalent in the popular Anglo-Catholicism of to-day, as a critic by no means unfriendly has recently been compelled to admit.

> 'With the rare and splendid exceptions of those known as Liberal Catholics,' says the Bishop of Kensington, 'the adherents of the Oxford Movement, on the whole, seek to evade the issues of the age by turning men's thoughts backwards, and looking for the solutions of life's problems in the past centuries, rather than pushing forward with open eyes to whatever God may have in store for the world and the Church in the future. Broadly speaking, it is not the Catholic party in the Church at the present moment which is doing most to interpret

* *The Development of Modern Catholicism.* By Wilfred L. Knox, M.A., and Alec R. Vidler, M.A., Priests of the Oratory of the Good Shepherd. (Published by Messrs. Philip Allan & Co., Ltd. Price 10/6.)

the Gospel in the light of the knowledge with which the past century has dowered the world.'

Among his 'rare and splendid exceptions' the Bishop would doubtless allot an honourable place to Canon Knox and Mr. Vidler. They have certainly given us a vigorous and courageous book instinct with the spirit of adventure. It merits sympathetic study by Modernists of all shades, but perhaps it is most significant as a challenge to popular Anglo-Catholicism. It echoes the question with which Dr. Henson challenged the Church of England nearly a generation ago; but their challenge is directed to the party to which they belong. Is Anglo-Catholicism to move backward to the receding past, or forward to the increasing future?

The reader of the book cannot fail to be impressed by the extent to which the authors cut themselves loose from the theology of the Tractarian Fathers. They look back no less to Maurice and the Cambridge School of Westcott, Hort and Lightfoot than to Liddon. In fact, they frankly admit the impossibility of reconciling the traditionalism of which Liddon was a leading exponent with the attitude of the scientific scholar. The traditionalist Christology had not even the recommendation of being orthodox, 'for the divinity has so swallowed up the humanity that the latter is reduced to something little better than the phantom humanity of Docetism.' Liddon's Christ 'is always *Aut Deus aut homo non bonus* and *Deus* to an extent which renders His humanity unmeaning.' They readily admit that in the controversy which raged round *Essays and Reviews* the Tractarians backed the wrong horse, and that the positive conclusions of those whom the Tractarians regarded as heresiarchs are the truisms of to-day. While deploring their tactlessness they pay tribute to their courage.

Canon Knox and Mr. Vidler regard the secession of Newman as marking the transformation of theological Tractarianism into a Ritualism whose appeal was practical rather than intellectual. The Movement was revitalized theologically by the publication of *Lux Mundi*. It is interesting to note that they allow full value to the fertilizing influence of non-Tractarian thought on this theological re-birth, especially to the influence of Maurice. Henceforth, although religion continued to suffer in credit from its earlier reluctance to come to terms with science, there was a steady advance. The rights of Biblical criticism and scientific research were now, within their own domain, admitted. The publication of *A New Commentary* marks yet another stage along the road on which the *Lux Mundi*

writers had entered, though, in the opinion of our authors it is no more than a half-way house seeing that it treats the historical narratives of the New Testament with more conservatism than most modern scholars would accept. The barrier which Gore imagined that he could erect against the free advance of Biblical criticism has been unavailing. They explicitly affirm that New Testament criticism is within the domain of the historical student and outside the battle-field of the central issues of Faith.

On reading *The Development of Modern Catholicism* one is constantly impressed by the discontinuity between the school of which the authors are representatives and old-fashioned Tractarianism. Not only do they diverge from the Tractarians diametrically in their attitude to historical and scientific criticism; their conception of the function of dogma is also very different; for they insist that 'the function of theology is not to expound a body of revealed dogmas.' The real continuity is rather a continuity of *ethos*. The basis of their theology is 'the Christian experience of redemption in Christ and the sacramental life of the Christian community,' or 'the whole complex of normal religious experience in the life of the ordinary Christian'; but throughout their book the tacit assumption is that this 'normal religious experience' is of the more narrowly Catholic type. Would they regard the religious experience of a Presbyterian or a Wesleyan, for instance, as abnormal? It would be truer to say that 'religious experience,' theology, and cultus act and re-act one on the other. The facts are against the theory that 'normal religious experience' leads to Catholicism, unless we regard Catholicism as something much more catholic than the Catholicism of the Anglo-Catholic, or for that matter, of the Roman Catholic. A firmer basis for a truly Catholic theology is the intuition of goodness, beauty and truth. This is the real 'normal religious experience,' the 'true light which lighteth every man coming into the world,' and not only is it a firmer, but it is also in reality a wider basis than a vague Christian experience of the Catholic and sacramental type. Our authors are simply begging the question when they assume that the 'whole complex of normal religious experience in the life of the ordinary Christian' will lead to a Catholicism less catholic than Christianity.

They regard the purely ethical approach to God through Jesus Christ as old-fashioned. No doubt it is only one line of approach among others; but if the Synoptic Gospels have any historical value at all, surely it is clear that it was the main line of approach along which Jesus would lead His followers. Canon Knox and Mr. Vidler do not agree with this reading of the Gospels and even go so far as to say that 'we have to face the fact that the Christ of the first three Gospels is not an exalted ethical teacher, but the prophet of an imminent judgment . . .' In fact they read the Gospels through the spectacles of a radical eschatology which has already become out-moded. In this they are at one with the Continental Modernism of the beginning of the century.

With this Continental Modernism the thought of Canon Knox and Mr. Vidler has close affinities, though they hold that that its attempt to isolate Christiantity as a system from the historical figure of Jesus of Nazareth has failed, and that its synthesis of theology and modern thought was too hasty. They emphasise the influence exerted by Continental Modernism on the more recent developments of Anglo-Catholicism. Though 'the average follower of the Anglo-Catholic Movement was far more inclined to fight for the faith once delivered to the Saints during the latter years of the war and immediately after it than he had been before,' Continental Modernism was not without contemporary sympathisers in the Anglo-Catholic camp. Con-

spicuous among these was Canon T. A. Lacey, whose sympathy was so close that Dean Inge felt impelled to protest that he upheld 'a formal orthodoxy based on an extreme scepticism.' The *Church Times* was also not unfriendly. Canon Knox and Mr. Vidler are able to print in small type nearly five pages of extracts from that organ of Anglo-Catholicism illustrating its sympathy towards the Modernist Movement. It is rather startling to be reminded that in 1907 a *Church Times* leading article gave expression to the unexceptionable sentiment that 'At all ages of movement the best servants of the Church have been the Modernists.' It is perhaps hardly a matter for surprise that the *Church Times* has not received too graciously this reminder of a flirtation which, it might hope, most of its readers have forgotten. This kind of thing is really too embarrassing.

Basing their theology on a religious experience which is a sacramental experience and therefore a Catholic experience, Canon Knox and Mr. Vidler are able to claim a large measure of freedom in dealing with the miraculous. The regard it as quite a secondary question whether miracles 'are true as history or accretions in which the primitive Church sought to express the truth' as to the nature of Christ's Person, and again of the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection they say that 'if the Incarnation be accepted the importance of their historical truth can be no more than secondary.' This is an example of the way in which, starting from very different premises, they ultimately join hands over and over again with the Anglican Modernist, who makes no pretension to the title of Anglo-Catholic.

'*Quo Tendimus?*' may well ask in some dismay the more conservative Anglo-Catholic of the rank and file if he should happen to read this stimulating and thought-provoking book. The time has come when it is of the first importance that those of the Anglo-Catholic clergy who share the outlook of Canon Knox and Mr. Vidler should make it their business to ensure that, whether he has read this particular book or not, he should realize that the road must be towards the increasing future rather than backward to the receding past. Canon Knox and Mr. Vidler have given most convincing reasons for regarding this as a primary duty.

> 'It is possible,' they say, 'to claim that theology has in the past fifty years rendered service to humanity by refusing to make the wholesale surrenders that were demanded of it in the name of scientific progress by the champions of ideas that have since then been abandoned. But it has done untold harm to religion by refusing to yield on any point until it was compelled to do so, and then yielding with as ill a grace as possible.'

The reticence of religious teachers is perpetuating the harm thus done during the past half-century. It is high time for the Liberal Catholic to carry his message into the market-place. There is important work to be done which will not be done if he abides for ever in his study.

G. L. H. Harvey.

THE ADVANCE OF NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM.*

Six years ago a theologian of repute declared in the hearing of the reviewer that if it could be shown that Mark's Gospel was was not a biography of Jesus, sufficiently accurate for practical purposes in its presentation of the course of the Ministry and in its account of the development of the Life and Teaching, and based on the memories of an eye-witness, then 'he would lose his faith.' He spoke in a measure hyperbolically, but with enough seriousness to allow of his remark serving as a pointer to the change that has come over New Testament critical views in England during the last decade. Two forces have been primarily responsible for that change.

As time has passed, the many implications and the full bearing of Dr. Streeter's great book, *The Four Gospels* (1924), have grown clearer. Dr. Streeter did not so much question the historical value of *Mark*, as unweave and lay bare the sundry sources of all the Synoptic Gospels, and so showed that much of what was peculiar to the First and Third shared in the value which the older view assigned uniquely to the Second. The immediate and profound result, pregnant with implications, was that *Mark* lost not its historicity, but its pre-eminence. Our Gospels were shown to be crystallizations of tradition moulded by Jew, God-fearer and Greek, and preserved and developed by individual Christian communities—Antioch, Rome and Ephesus. While *Mark* remains the earliest of our Gospels as we have them, the other two contain tradition which, if sometimes contradictory and later gathered into its present form, is yet as primitive, even more primitive. This conclusion was used with especial power by Dr. Streeter in his creation of the Proto-Luke hypothesis.

The second force which has diminished the supremacy of *Mark* is that exerted by the *Formgeschichtliche Schule*, a name which Professor Goguel says cannot be translated into either French or English but is well understood in this country, since

* *The Life of Jesus.* By Maurice Goguel, Professor at the Faculté libre de Théologie Protestante (Paris), D.D. (St. Andrews). Translated by Olive Wyon. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1933. Published by Payot, Paris, 1932. Price 25/-.)

the work of Dr. Easton and more recently of Dr. Vincent Taylor, under the designation 'Form-criticism.' The basic, and it seems to us the surest, thesis of Form-critics such as Dibelius and Bultmann is that before the Gospels were written the tradition consisted, not of a remembered, oral Life of Jesus, however unorganized, but of separate 'fragments' about Him or supposed to have been uttered by Him, each complete in itself and each of a distinctive style according to its kind, were it Debate, Incident, Parable, Apothegm or Miracle-story. The Gospels are collections of such fragments, or, importantly, of groups of fragments of a like kind. The fragments may be short — an aphorism in a setting sufficient only to give it occasion and point; or as long as the Passion-narratives which this School agrees had at one time separate existences as complete stories in something like their present forms. Thus our Gospels happen to be our collections of the earlier fragments, their plans of collection a matter for argument, and of them Mark's was made first and John's last, but between them, if we ask about historicity, is a difference not of kind but of degree. The precipice supposed to cut the Synoptics from *John* is a steep slope in reality, and *Mark* is not a peak.

It will be seen that the two transforming forces have worked along one line. The student who troubled to apply to his Gospels the instruments provided by Dr. Streeter was more than prepared for the findings of the Form-critics when these became known in this country. For one other reason these latter, as Goguel points out, are not so original as the finders claim nor, we may add, as they are often supposed to be by those whom they disturb, for their basic hypothesis had been adumbrated by Wrede, Johannes Weiss and Wellhausen.

An understanding of such modern critical views and some answer to the questions they raise, long urgent for the specialist, are now equally so for every thoughtful Christian, and particularly for every clergyman. The Life of Jesus preached in England to-day in most Modernist and Liberal churches is that constructed by the Liberal-Protestant School towards the end of the nineteenth century, which was claimed to be a right interpretation of the facts given in *Mark* confirmed by a proper understanding of the other Synoptists. In England, where for-

tunately the responsible members see their party in some perspective, the influence of this School has been much wider than the bounds of confessed Liberalism. The popular form of the Liberal-Protestant view has led to pulpit and book references to *Mark* as conclusive, and at its extreme has regarded that Gospel as nearly a cinematographic and dictaphonic record. Theologically, Jesus has been represented by this School as an ideal contemporary Christian born out of time. 'The majority, and above all the older ones' (of the nineteenth century *Lives of Jesus*) 'tend to modernize Jesus and to make Him the type of the religious man' (Goguel, p. 54).

The view became dominant. 'It is not saying too much to speak of a consensus of criticism of the *Lives of Jesus* at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries' (p. 55). Yet the Liberal position, even before Proto-Luke and Form-criticism, was open, we think, to two grave objections. Mark's Gospel, in fact, bears much evidence of an editor's hand, more than can be explained by the hypothesis that it is the writing-up of an eye-witness's memories.[1] There are connecting and introductory sentences between incidents and between sayings, the more significant in that they fail adequately to cover the *lacunae*; there is awareness of repetition; postponement of climax, as in the story of the fig-tree; conscious artistry and dramatic arrangement, howbeit simple; and theological preconceptions. Again, 'the *plan* of *Mark* is both historical and geographical;—it is also psychological. Finally, this plan is dogmatic' (Goguel, p. 145). The Liberals averred that within Mark's simple account they could detect Jesus as He was and moved and grew. All concede that some indications of at least a developing Teaching there is in *Mark*; but the question is, whatever the dramatic plan we see in *Mark*, is it there because the Gospel does give us, though at second-hand, the facts in their own order, or because the Gospeller has imposed his plan on his original, unorganized material? Or is there a *tertium quid* possible?

The second criticism was as grave. In reason we should not suppose Jesus of Galilee nineteen hundred years ago to have been and behaved as a modern European Christian, and critic-

[1] The *Ur-Markus* theory, right or wrong as an explanation of the facts, in this country chiefly advocated by Dr. Vernon Bartlett, has testified to this.

ally, scholars, and for English readers most notably Albert Schweitzer, have pointed us to the eschatological element in the reported teaching of Jesus and reminded us we cannot ignore it without seriously challenging the reliability of the rest of the tradition.'

It is erroneous and unfair to suggest, as is sometimes done, that what was essentially the Liberal-Protestant *Life* was primarily, or even chiefly, a theological reconstruction of the *membra disjecta* of the Gospel facts, as Goguel calls them. That cannot be maintained against so important a group of scholars, and headed by Harnack. But perhaps it is true now that modern critical views are winning their way too slowly in Liberal studies and parishes because of the supposed theological need to maintain an alternative to the Life of Jesus preached, and presumed, in the more obscurantist of the Anglo-Catholic pulpits. Gore elaborated the kenotic theory, curiously, to allow for the very considerations which determined the findings of the Liberals, but by its very nature and by the popular use of it, that theory has preserved doggedly an omnipotent and omniscient Godhead in Christ. The kenotic interpretation is popularly preached, though illogically, together with a doctrine of *communicatio idiomatum* frequently still as advanced as was Liddon's in his Bampton Lectures. The avowed intent is to emphasize, as against the Liberals, the transcendental in the Life of Jesus — a transcendental interpreted, however, in terms to justify twentieth century English sacerdotalism; and the unadvertized intent is to fight a stubborn rearguard action following the defeat of the Tractarians at the hands of science in the nineteenth century. To think politically is disastrous in the religious field, and in any case the effect of Dr. Streeter's book and the acceptance of what is sure in Form-criticism has forced the abandonment of the Liberal-Protestant reconstruction of the Life of Jesus. Is it then, as Goguel asks, 'that the immense labour of research which has been expended upon the Life of Jesus from the days of Reimarus to the *Formgeschichtliche Schule* . . . (has) ended in nothing but a confession of impotence?' Is the parish priest, we may further ask, to turn in despair of knowing and preaching Jesus to some general doctrine about life, not specifically Christian, such as Barthianism, or to some psychological method of promoting the good life, not specifically Christian either, such as that practised by the Oxford Groups? From all hands—the Catholic Modernist joins his voice—comes the assurance, really based on 'thorough-going scepticism,' that what the actual life and character of Jesus may in fact have been does not matter very much. Let us make what reconstruction our theology and religion dictate. 'It looks,' writes Goguel, 'as if a whole host of literary men and of philosophers' (and, we would add, of psychologists) 'is advancing in good order to take possession of the territory abandoned by the historians in their retreat.'

The student, clerical or lay, anxious to learn what is the situation in modern criticism, anxious to realize the problems which that situation creates in an attempt to reconstruct the Life of Jesus, and to know how far such reconstruction is possible, could not do better than read carefully Professor Goguel's book. Especially it would repay him to carry out the author's own suggestion and work through the book with the help of a *Synopsis*. Taken as a whole, this is the most comprehensive, the best-balanced and the most informative book on its subject which has appeared

for five years. The critical waters will not settle for a long time, and much remains cloudy after the book is read; but the problems are seen, and for settlement none can afford to wait.

The proportions of Professor Goguel's book are significant of the times. Two hundred and seventy-one pages are occupied with preliminary discussion of previous research, of non-Christian sources for the Life, the Pauline evidence, the growth of the Gospel tradition, the nature of the problem, chronology, the form of the Teaching, and other important subjects; though by the necessity of the modern method much of the Life itself is discussed *in passim*. The story of the Life occupies 244 pages, and of these 125 pages are concerned with the last two or three days. The whole book is a first volume, and to a second, which will deal with the early Church, is deferred discussion of the Resurrection narratives.

For Professor Goguel the Gospels are, all four, collections made at different times of short stories about Jesus, sayings, parables, miracle-stories, which existed in finished form before the Gospels were written.

> 'It is now established that the plans of the four Gospels, that of the Synoptics as much as that of John, are artificial creations, designed to group together into a coherent whole traditions which formerly had an independent existence.'

Thus Goguel agrees with the main contention of the Form-critics, but nowhere is his sanity and judgment better exemplified than in his presentation and criticism of the theories of this School. In place of the words and doings of Jesus as both the root of the tradition and the driving force in its formation, this School substitute the preaching requirements of the first Christian teachers, the need to account for the early Church cultus, and a general law which they claim to discover in the development of all tradition and legend.[2] But Goguel answers, 'There are no laws of evolution in tradition, but simply some facts of a more or less general character' (p. 163). True, 'the development of the Gospel tradition seems to be dominated by certain general tendencies,' but these are not evidences of general laws of legend-growth at work. Those who declare the Gospel tradition is the result of the cultus 'try to explain something which is imperfectly known by something which is absolutely unknown,' while the cultus of the early Church may well have been the adaptation for the needs of the Church of elements in the Gospel tradition. Thus Goguel would consider the principal thesis of the Form-critics to be right and fruitful, but on how the independent pieces of tradition came to be, he parts company with them.

> 'One method alone enables us to discern the real nature of the development of the Gospel tradition, and that is to make a careful analysis of the parallel narratives and then try to discover the reason for the changes which have been introduced into the text. By means of this method it is possible to disengage and bring to light certain general tendencies in the development of the tradition.'

That is a sound summing-up and a timely rehabilitation of the methods of literary and historical criticism as still indispensable. Professor Goguel does not add, what is obvious enough, that even if the first Christian teachers formed the original 'gospel' by answering specific questions and needs, there is no presumption necessary that they invented the answers;

[2] A few verses are assigned to Jesus by each critic. Thus Bultmann assigns to Him many of the eschatological sayings.

and the preservation of the growingly awkward eschatological element in the Teaching as late as the writing of the Gospels is strong evidence for the honesty and reliability of many of the teachers.

The Gospellers were not concerned to write a biography; but Professor Goguel's comment is right and, again, needful of making to-day; it is all the more significant that so much of the Life and Teaching has been preserved. St. Paul, Goguel holds against many modern critics, knew much about the Life, and both he and the Gospellers presume such knowledge in their readers (p. 135). Clearly, for Goguel, knowledge of the Life of Jesus is essential to Christianity, primitive or modern. How much about that Life can we know? We must limit our aim straightaway and set out, critically, to disinter, from all the Gospels viewed together, not the Life directly, but stories, sayings and incidents in their most primitive forms. That will give us fragments of the Life of which we can be sure. We can be as sure of no more: 'We must resign ourselves to remain ignorant of many things about Jesus which we would like to know,' and 'in any sketch which may be attempted large blanks will remain.'

Yet much and enough may be known. 'For the historian who seeks not only to state the facts but to understand them, the main lines of the Life of Jesus are clear.' Psychological interpretation not only may, but must be used, as always in historical science; indeed with caution and wholly subject to the check of criticism, but then with confidence. 'As Wrenle says, in order to understand Jesus the historian ought to have in himself something that is like Jesus. . . . It is possible . . . to outline some features in the personality of Jesus, to perceive some elements in His history, but not to make a complete portrait of Him nor to compose a biography.' 'The thought of Jesus is more accessible than His life,' and because of the genius of His teaching method and of His literary art, 'the supple garment of His thought,' spontaneous, simple yet never banal, 'although His personality remains the most mysterious in history, it is also the most transparent.'

Some of Professor Goguel's conclusions seem a little dogmatic, even allowing for the fact, of which many footnotes remind us, that they depend upon arguments advanced in a previous work, *Introduction au Nouveau Testament.*[3] English readers will find it strange to see Dr. Streeter's Proto-Luke hypothesis dismissed in a footnote, since in this country it is now questioned by few and then, we think, not effectively. Again, in keeping with his rejection of Dr. Streeter's view, Goguel twice refers to *Mark* as the earliest form of the tradition, appearing to attach a significance to this description hard to reconcile with his modern view of the sources. His treatment of the Fourth Gospel seems inadequate, even as a summary, and he takes it as he finds it, only referring to the varieties of what may be called 'The Disarranged Pages Hypothesis' twice in footnotes, and once then with reference only to Chapters v and vi, though he assumes the displacement of the Temple-cleansing by the compiler of the diverse fragments which he says go to make up *John.*

The book is remarkably free of *ad hoc* inventiveness to secure continuity of argument, and very free, too, of evidence of 'reactions.' One example of each may be noted. The suggestion, no more, that Luke, of all the Synoptists, did not know that scourging was part of normal Roman procedure as a preliminary to crucifixion is a particularly difficult one in the light of what we know of Luke from *Acts*; and Goguel's dismissal of the

[3] Vols. I—IV, 1922-1926.

evidence of Papias that Mark wrote 'accurately but not in order' as tendencious, seems from its tone in part a reaction against the Liberal-Protestant view, so dependent on Papias, and ignores, as did also many of the Liberals, the rest of Papias' evidence which gives an account of St. Peter's teaching method, at least *prima facie,* much in harmony with the theories of the Form-critics. He taught about Jesus 'according to the needs of his hearers.'

The ministry of Jesus is portrayed as made up of a Galilean ministry beginning in the spring of 27 A.D. and moving to a crisis centred in time and place upon the Feeding of the Multitude. Jesus goes to Jerusalem in the September of 27, and remains there until December. 'Then He retires to a solitary place some distance from Jerusalem, while He remains in contact with the disciples He has gained at Jerusalem.' The reconciliation here of the Synoptists' and the Johannine accounts is interesting. The story of the Last Supper is 'etiological in character.' 'The narratives have been influenced by the liturgical practice, but this does not mean that the facts themselves did not give birth to the practice,' and Goguel thinks there is a basis of fact, and makes a suggestion as to what may have taken place. The Arrest, Trial, Sentence, and Crucifixion are discussed at length; and constantly throughout the book the attempt is made to discover what was the intent in the mind of Jesus.

The book discusses on its way many most interesting questions for students, and always lucidly, and with great economy of words. The section on non-Christian sources for the Life is a particularly valuable summary; and the lucidity especially pleasing in discussion of the dates of the Birth and the Death. The eschatological element is accepted without cavil, rather as Schweitzer sees it, but soberly related to the moral teaching to make the single impression which undoubtedly was originally given by one so sane as Jesus. A section on miracles maintains that while tradition has exaggerated and added to them, Jesus Himself probably thought that He performed them, as would one of His time and circumstance. A most illuminating short section demonstrates the fallacy of using the mathematician's device of extrapolation in criticism, a use certainly common in the older School; because miracles are enhanced in what we can tell is later tradition, it does not follow that they had no place whatever in the earlier: because, we may add, a sense of reverence heightens the impression of Divinity in the later tradition, it does not follow that in the earlier appeared only a humanitarian's ideal figure. But it must also be added that where we have recovered the earliest record of the facts, it will not reflect the impression which the facts would have made upon us. A miracle for an eye-witness creator of tradition in the first century would not necessarily seem a miracle to us, which proviso Goguel implies in his reminder of what the ancient outlook was.

We think too much space is devoted to refuting the 'myth' theorists, who are taken too seriously. Readers will remember Schweitzer's few terse sentences in his Autobiography, which are sufficient and conclusive. It was perhaps also too kind to advertise at length, if only to refute, the Josephus theories of Eisler.

The footnotes are copious and many, but so lucid that they form one of the most interesting and informative parts of the book. The translation seems admirable, reading easily and consistently, a difficult achievement in such a work, save perhaps on pages 102 and 159, where there are confusions that may, however, have existed in the original.

M.T.D.

EDWARD GIBBON AND CHRISTIANITY*

Gibbon's Antagonism to Christianity, by Shelby T. McCloy, Instructor in History, Duke University, North Carolina, dedicated to Professor Foakes Jackson, is the work of an American scholar who is a Bachelor of Literature of Oxford. Its purpose is to give a comprehensive account of the controversy which began with the publication in 1776 of the first volume of Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, and which has continued intermittently down to our own time. The first volume of Gibbon's History contained the famous fifteenth and sixteenth chapters, which deal with the rise and progress of the Christian Church and the persecutions which its adherents underwent at the hands of the State. Under a polite veil of irony Gibbon seeks to insinuate that Christianity contributed to the downfall of ancient civilisation. He implies that the claim put forth on behalf of Christianity that it is of supernatural origin, an origin attested by miracles, is an illusion; that, in fact, it owed its origin and progress to natural causes, which he proceeds to enumerate.

Gibbon was not, as is sometimes supposed, a mere scoffer, a hard and cynical person; he could be sardonic, of course, but we are all inclined to be sardonic about what we don't like. His essential affinity lay less with Voltaire than with the sentimental humanitarian type represented by Rousseau in France and Sterne in England. Anyone who wants to appreciate the sentimental side of Gibbon should read his account of the death of Julian. And he could use sonorous rhetoric about the Supreme Being and 'the specious and noble tenet' of the immortality of the soul—rhetoric certainly not wholly insincere, though clouded with a doubt. He hates priestcraft and enthusiasm. His attitude is, in the main, that of the ordinary eighteenth century *philosophe*; what was peculiar to him was the wide range of his learning and the impressive dignity of his style.

Mr. McCloy expressly disclaims any intention to discuss the profound issues raised by Gibbon. He says in his Preface:

> 'This book does not include discussion of the merits of the opposing positions taken by Gibbon and his adversaries, nor does it include

* *Gibbon's Antagonism to Christianity*. By Shelby T. McCloy. (Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 1933. Price £1 1s. 0d. net.)

treatment of Gibbon's sources, authorities, and psychological determinants. For a complete study of the controversy it might well be expected that these be made. The author, however, must reserve these other phases for the future.'

The present work, therefore, might seem at first sight merely a *catalogue raisonné* of the attacks on Gibbon's history of the Christian Church and the replies and rejoinders of Gibbon and those who sympathized with his standpoint, a compendium marked by truly American thoroughness and diligence. In fact, however, it is a much more interesting and entertaining book than such a description would suggest. Mr. McCloy's inquiries take him into many fascinating by-paths of eighteenth century biography. Scrupulously fair as he is, and keeping his own viewpoint carefully in reserve, he makes from time to time shrewd and penetrating observations of his own, and his concluding paragraphs show that he is well abreast of the thought of to-day.

We suppose that very few people nowadays know anything of the 'polemics of either university who discharged their sermons or pamphlets against the impenetrable silence of the Roman historian,' and whose names are preserved, like flies in amber, in the Autobiography. Gibbon affects a tone of contemptuous indulgence towards his critics, and congratulates himself that he has been the means of providing some of them with a competence.

> 'Poor Chelsum was indeed neglected; and I dare not boast the making Dr. Watson a Bishop; he is a prelate of large mind and liberal spirit; but I enjoyed the pleasure of giving a royal pension to Mr. Davis, and of collating Dr. Apthorpe to an archiepiscopal living.'

Mr. McCloy, however, has actually read the writings of Gibbon's assailants, and we are glad to learn, for the credit of our ancient universities, that they were by no means the stupid pedants the world has believed them. Of Davis, the Oxonian (it seems the statement about the pension is erroneous), our author thinks very highly. He finds his work 'clear, animated and racy,' and says that Davis employed a vast amount of time in investigating the sources cited by Gibbon. His chief fault seems to have been a tendency to the *odium theologicum,* to be excused, perhaps, on the ground of youth; he was only twenty-two. But he detected some real errors in detail, and drew from Gibbon a Vindication, in which the Roman historian exhibited a pique not altogether consonant with the Olympian pose assumed in his Autobiography.

> 'I cannot profess myself very desirous of Mr. Davis' acquaintance; but if he will take the trouble of calling at my house any afternoon when I am *not* at home, my servant will show him my library, which he will find tolerably well furnished with the useful authors, ancient as well as modern, ecclesiastical as well as profane, who have *directly* supplied me with the materials of my history.'

The Cambridge defenders of the faith showed greater mildness than the Oxford theologians; Dr. Watson, the Regius Professor of Divinity, afterwards Bishop of Landaff and author of an Apology for the Bible, was a scholar, a gentleman, and what would be called to-day a modern churchman.

> 'Courteous, liberal, philosophical, and charming in his literary style, Watson has set forth his position in an attractive manner . . . Sometimes he takes issue with Gibbon strongly, but not infrequently when he does so, he addresses him with the title of "Sir."'

The greatest of Cambridge scholars, Richard Porson, in his Letter to Archdeacon Travis on the Three Heavenly Witnesses praises Gibbon's history, though he censures his rage for indecency and his hatred of Christianity. And the shrewd Paley asked, 'Who can refute a sneer?'

Time passed, and it came to be generally acknowledged that the *Decline and Fall* was, whatever its faults, the greatest historical work in the English language. Newman sadly smiles, 'It is notorious that the English Church is destitute of an Ecclesiastical History; Gibbon is almost our sole authority for subjects as near the heart of a Christian as any can well be.' It might be dangerous to drink the waters of knowledge from a tainted cup, but could not the poison be extracted? Dr. Bowdler, graduate in medicine of Edinburgh University, after having rendered the writings of Shakespeare perfectly innocuous, devoted the last years of his long life to a purifying of Gibbon's History, omitting all passages of an irreligious or immoral tendency. His nephew and biographer says that it was his peculiar happiness 'to have so purified Shakespeare and Gibbon that they could no longer raise a blush on the cheek of modest innocence nor plant a pang in the heart of the devout Christian.'

Less drastic was the treatment of Gibbon at the hands of that great scholar and most able man, Dean Milman, who published in 1839 an edition of the History; Gibbon is given verbatim, but notes by the editor and other distinguished writers are added to correct the bias of the anti-Christian passages. These notes are reproduced in the monumental edition of the *Decline and Fall* in eight volumes published by Sir William Smith in 1854. Mr. Winston Churchill has told us that when he was a young subaltern he read Gibbon in this edition, and rather resented the editorial notes.

The Roman Catholic Church is no friend to half-measures. It has put the *Decline and Fall* on the index.

The real reply to Gibbon and Voltaire was the French Revolution. They were masters of irony, but history has an irony of its own which far surpasses the puny efforts of man. A nineteenth century Jew spoke of the Aristophanes in heaven, and a Jew of a much earlier period expressed the same thought in the words, 'He that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh them to scorn; the Lord shall have them in derision.' The so-called philosophers had forgotten the populace; they thought that gentlemen might indulge in speculative unbelief and speculative republicanism, while the lower orders would continue to walk in the traditions of their fathers. It was a vain dream. The masses got wind of the scepticism of their betters, and, in their crude way, drew the most unwarrantable conclusions. French peasants, for example, when they heard that most clever men denied the truth of the Christian religion, began to ask why they should pay tithes to its priests. With the lamentable proceedings of 1789—1793, which Gibbon deplored as much as anybody, the pleasant compromise of the eighteenth century collapsed.

The French Revolution left the upper classes throughout Europe eager for a return to orthodoxy. The Catholic reaction on the Continent, which

began with the publication of Chateaubriand's *Génie de Christianisme,* and which spread to England in the form of the Oxford Movement, swept away the rather superficial liberalism of the so-called Age of Enlightenment. And when the critical movement began again about the middle of the nineteenth century, physical science and the higher criticism had armed the opponents of orthodoxy with weapons of precision which made the tactics of Gibbon seem antiquated.

Inevitably, perhaps, Mr. McCloy's survey of what he calls the Gibbon Controversy is less complete when he comes to modern times. He says nothing, for instance, of the discussion of the relation of the rise of Christianity to the downfall of ancient civilzation to be found in Boissier's *Fin de Paganisme.* Boissier thinks that the decline of Graeco-Roman civilization began before Christianity had made much progress. Mr. McCloy's final paragraph, however, sums up very well the present state of the question :

> ' If one accepts the now prevailing point of view, Gibbon's emphasis upon the Christian religion as the main cause of the decadence of ancient Pagan culture is to be ascribed to the rationalistic trend of his time. New materials and a deepened knowledge of the important influence of Iranian beliefs upon the religious thought of the Hellenistic and Roman periods have made it clear that even in the field of religious influence Christianity stood by no means alone. The present tendency with respect to the omnipresent historical problem of ' the fall of Rome ' is to approach it from the biological point of view, as in the case of Otto Seeck ; or to discover here a deep conflict of social and economic forces, as in the case of Michael Rostovtzeff ; or, as in the case of Oswald Spengler, to regard ' the fall ' as one phase of a cycle through which each outstanding people must pass, when dynamic energy produces a static civilization that ends in decadence.'

Mr. McCloy's standard of accuracy is so high that it is worth while to point out that on page 47 William Wilberforce, the anti-slavery leader, is confounded with his son, Samuel Wilberforce, Bishop of Oxford, known to his detractors as Soapy Sam, the subject of Mr. Hardwick's recent biography. Also that in the index, though not in the text, Theodora, the wife of Justinian, is confused with Theodora, the wife of Theophilus, a less notorious lady.

GAMALIEL MILNER.

THE THRESHOLD OF ETHICS.*

This is one of the *Keble Books* which are being issued in connection with the centenary of the Oxford Movement. *Rambles in the Land of Ethics* would, I venture to suggest, be a more appropriate title. It is as if the author were conducting his readers on a succession of explorations along devious paths over a rugged country, skirting obstacles, and where the ways diverge choosing the more interesting and passable route. The observant tourist thus gathers acquaintance with a large tract of the ethical domain, without, however, having ascended any lofty eminence for a wide view.

* *The Threshold of Ethics.* By K. E. Kirk. (Skeffington. 1933. 3/6.)

As one might expect, Dr. Kirk begins with the subject of conscience, of which he offers this description: 'a capacity of moral judgment advancing slowly and painfully, by the method of trial and error, towards an understanding of the principles of human duty which will never be more than partial' (p. 39). In the course of these excursions—to continue the illustration—he meets and defends conscience against three enemies: the new psychology, the evolutionary theory of its origin, the modern doctrine of humanism. In the first, he exposes the deterministic implications of the new physchology as expounded in the brief and entertaining volume by Dr. Hadfield, *Psychology and Morals*; not that Dr. Hadfield ever in so many words denies the freedom of the will. In the second, he distinguishes three phases through which the evolutionary theory of ethics has passed—optimism, uncertainty, pessimism. Dr. Kirk is abundantly right in his denunciation of the supposition that morality—or any other essential factor of human nature—is to be degraded because of its lowly origin. But he betrays, I think, a suspicious eagerness to accept a pessimistic interpretation of the evolutionary process, ignoring the reasoned optimism such as we find in Professor J. A. Thomson's *Gospel of Evolution*. In quoting T. H. Huxley's oft-quoted Romanes Lecture on *Evolution and Ethics*, Dr. Kirk does not make allowance for the great biologist's cynicism and disillusionment, nor considers the difficulty of reconciling such a view with a reasonable theism. Thirdly, he defends conscience against humanism, which he calls a successor to utilitarianism. He confesses, by the way, no little regard for that stoical humanist, Walter Lippmann, praising his treatment of sex and marriage, while arguing that it virtually implies some form of ethical intuitionism.

Having repelled these foes of conscience, Dr. Kirk proceeds to tell us of its outcome—'conscientiousness,' which he distinguishes from rightness. He makes shrewd observations on imagined moral dilemmas, puts forward the promotion of conscientiousness as one great ethical aim, but sees clearly that it cannot be the only one and makes a confession of inability to find a comprehensive formula for determining what is right. In the last chapter, he contrasts conscientiousness with saintliness, declaring the great superiority of saintliness, and inquires how

one may pass from the lower to the higher of these moral states. He is painfully aware that conscientiousness tends either to morbid scrupulosity or to Pharisaic egotism and hypocrisy, diseases which resist the efforts of the patient to obtain a cure. The more he strains to escape the strain, the more strained he becomes. The remedy must lie in some activity excited in him by some attractive power which draws him out of himself. And the most potent of such activities is worship. It is worship that delivers a man from the artificial and feverish self-centredness that besets a too zealous moralism and transforms the self-conscious and painstaking devotee of a restricted righteousness into the self-forgetful and care-free saint with his overflowing goodness. Thus, characteristically, the author begins with conscience and ends with the vision of God. This gives a notable climax to the book.

The reviewer recalls a remark of Dr. Rashdall's in his University lectures, that the type of system one arrives at in ethics is very largely determined by the question with which one starts —in particular, whether one begins by asking how we know what is right, or by asking what is the good. Now Dr. Kirk commences by a question concerning the criterion of right and wrong, sketches an intuitionist type of ethics, and lifts himself out of its difficulties by the ladder of religion. At the same time, he is generous with his praise of the thinkers who make 'good' fundamental and 'right' subordinate — especially Stuart Mill and Hastings Rashdall — where he finds himself in agreement with them. And yet he cursorily dismisses ideal utilitarianism with its principle of the 'duty to promote the highest good' (p. 106), apparently unconscious that his intuitionist doctrine, that 'an action is right because it is right' (p. 107), is no less vulnerable.

Would it not be wiser to assume that ethical theories both of the subjective and intuitionist order and of the objective or utiltarian order — corresponding respectively to the dispositions of the introvert and of the extrovert — have alike their legitimate places and functions? If the latter tends to a sensuous worldliness, the former, as Dr. Kirk admits, is in peril of Pharisaism. To explain 'right' and 'ought' as conducive to 'good' is supported by non-ethical usage, as when we say that an orchardist ought to prune his trees, or that a certain physician discovered the right serum for a certain disease. As these partial 'oughts' and 'rights' relate to partial 'goods,' so, one is led to think, the absolute 'ought' and 'right' of conduct relate to the absolute 'good' of human life and the universe. Only, in

morals, the 'ought' and the 'right' appear often to be more important than the good to which they are directed — as, for instance, the unselfishness of a child is more valuable than the satisfactory distribution of toffee which ensues. This does not mean, as Dr. Kirk seems to say, that a right act is right independently of its results, but rather that its results are far vaster than appear or are even contemplated. For man, according to the Christian hope or any philosophy that does justice to his ideals, is destined to a transcendent life, for which his present conduct either qualifies or disqualifies. The conditions are ripe for a synthesis of these two trends of ethical theory and the two trends of moral living and aspiration which they represent — that which, starting from conscience and duty, reaches out through worship to the beatific vision, and that which, commencing with simple kindness and charity and the endeavour to improve the circumstances of human existence, goes on to dream of a humanity made perfect in God. Seeing that both these trends are to be found balanced and interwoven in the Gospel and the character of the Saviour which it presents, we cannot esteem any ethical doctrine worthy to be called Christian that does not comprise both in ample measure.

F. A. M. Spencer.

ONE STANDPOINT *

This is one of a series of 'Standpoints,' edited by the author of this particular volume. Dr. Kirk has succeeded in packing much information and argument into a comparatively small space. He gives an intricate discussion on the 'exceptive' clause in St. Matthew's record of our Lord's debate with the Pharisees on divorce. The supposition that He pronounced in favour of the Shammai party and against the Hillel party Dr. Kirk dismisses as 'utterly apocryphal' (p. 6). He concludes that there is 'no case whatever for the suggestion that any New Testament source credited our Lord with sanctioning re-marriage after divorce, even where the partner's adultery was the ground of the divorce' (p. 67). He further denies that there is any 'scriptural warrant whatever for suggesting that our Lord intended His prohibition to be taken as a "counsel"' (p. 71). Dr. Kirk gives a brief and instructive survey of the respective attitudes of the Greek and Roman and Anglican Communions towards divorce and the circumstances which invite it, referring at some length to a recent notorious decree of nullity issued by the Vatican. Conscious that the modern world will not be content with authority derived from the past, even from the Gospels, he attempts to base the indissolubility of marriage on the conception of it as a

* *Marriage and Divorce*. By K. E. Kirk. (The Centenary Press. 1933. 3/6.)

vocation—a vocation irrevocable during the lifetime of both of the partners. He observes that '*the true difficulty begins only when the "innocent" partner meets someone else whom he or she desires to marry*. . . . But the fact remains that the innocent partner can only think of marriage with this third person as possible if he or she is prepared . . . to play traitor to one of the most solemn obligations which anyone can undertake' (p. 120).

Nevertheless Dr. Kirk is aware that such strictness cannot be enforced, eventually proposing as an ecclesiastic discipline that re-married divorcees should be disqualified from membership in parochial church councils and the Church Assembly. Perhaps this might have some slight effect as a stigma, though the majority of such offenders are not likely to want to serve on these bodies. But the pressing problems of how the Church and its priests are to deal with the families and homes—not always vicious or miserable — in which one or both of the parents has severed — or, if it be preferred, offended against — a previous matrimonial bond, Dr. Kirk does not deal with. Nor does he counsel how to ensure that marriages should be really and securely Christian from their commencement, so that these unpleasant and vexing problems would not arise. An adequate treatment of Christian marriage would be very largely concerned with these constructive and educative aspects.

F. A. M. SPENCER.

RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.*

Mr. Lunn's indictment of the religious instruction that is given in the Public Schools is more animated than might be expected from one who ranks himself with 'those who . . . are perhaps too much inclined to distrust the emotional.' Witty, often passionate, so sincere as to blind him to his moments of vulgarity, his opening chapter challenges eight other writers, including a bishop and three headmasters of leading schools, whose contributions occupy the rest of the book.

Mr. Lunn sees clearly that the trouble lies in the modern world's lack of faith: '. . . it is difficult to expect masters of whom a small minority are Christians in any proper sense of the term to preach Christianity.' And there is much truth, though not much novelty, in his descriptions of some contemporary religious attitudes. He rightly holds that a view of Christ as a

* *Public School Religion.* Edited by Arnold Lunn. (Faber & Faber. 1933. 7/6.)

merely human figure—whatever disguise such a view may wear—can never be allowed to pass for Christian doctrine. But his reasoning in this connection is confused; he first appears to rest the Divinity of Christ upon the evidence of miracle, and then to establish the truth of the miracles by appealing to the fact of Christ's Divinity. In either case he attributes to the Gospel miracles a relative importance which seems to belong to what has been called 'the spurious mysticism of the materialist.'

It is in his proposals for the reform of religious education that Mr. Lunn is least effective. Feeling as he does that the root of the mischief is a general decay of Christian faith and practice, he surprises us by fastening his hopes upon a revision of the school curriculum. Church history is to be thoroughly taught, and apologetics are to be studied. He proposes that Paley's *Evidences of Christianity* should be read in school—a book which the University of Cambridge has ceased to recommend to undergraduates, as likely to lead to a poor estimate of the Christian case. Mr. Lunn's view of the place of miracle in Christian apologetics being what it is, his choice of this book is not remarkable.

Some of the subsequent writers offer pertinent criticisms of the details of Mr. Lunn's proposals, though no one would deny the importance of trying to remedy the present gross ignorance about the history, grounds and tenets of our faith. But Mr. Lunn must know that to teach boys *about* religion is not to make them religious. In this connection the essay by Mr. Hollis, a master at Stonyhurst, is interesting, for this writer, standing serenely aside from controversy, describes the Catholic system of religious instruction, which, in its mellow sagacity and rich and integral design, would seem to be the fulfilment of Mr. Lunn's dreams. To the Protestant mind the contemplation of such a system is bound, despite Mr. Hollis' protests, to evoke images of boys being clamped and riveted into the whole armour of God. But the relevant implication surely is that a full system of instruction can only flourish where faith already abounds, not that faith can be manufactured by instruction. Be that as it may, Mr. Lunn, and the Rev. E. C. E. Owen later in the book, seem, like Mr. Hollis, to trust overmuch to authoritarian methods.

Mr. Lunn does not hesitate to describe how mistaught he was at Harrow; and Dr. Alington, while he does not wish 'to be taken to maintain that all is for the best in Public School religion,' illustrates, with reference to present practice at Eton, some interesting attempts to make the best of a difficult situation. There is no contribution from the headmaster of Mr. Lunn's old school, but those who have read *The English Tradition of Education*, or the Bishop of Liverpool's *Life and the Public Schools*, will be already familiar with some of the thought that has been given to the whole problem and some of the experiments that have been made.

Other contributors offer helpful comments and suggestions. The gravity of the situation is under-estimated by none, but attention is drawn to those aspects of the picture that Mr. Lunn overlooks: the wise and devoted (and not unfruitful) ministry of many Christian masters, in the classroom and in casual, friendly encounter, as well as in the chapel and in the special work of preparing boys for confirmation; the growing interest shown by boys themselves in problems of religious faith and practice, and their readiness to respond to an appeal which is not merely humanitarian in character, but truly Christian. Two outstanding obstacles to progress are emphasized: one is the home where religion is absent or perfunctory; the other is the hopelessly inadequate equipment of many of the masters who teach 'Scripture'—men who, through no particular fault of their own, know neither their subject nor how to teach it.

This book is a conglomeration rather than an ordered symposium; the essays are written too independently of one another, and are too diverse in quality, aim and point of view to combine into a constructive treatment of the problem. The total result is interesting, though perhaps depressing, as samples of what Public School men have to say about religion in Public Schools. To a reader who looks to the book for substantial guidance on the subject of religious education, the chapter by the Headmaster of Leys will be of real value; this is definitely the best part of the book, and is the only contribution that can rank in quality with Professor Raven's *Christ and Modern Education* or the Rev. T. Grigg-Smith's *The Child's Knowledge of God*. The Headmaster of Leys sees the problem as a whole, and treats it comprehensively and with insight.

In the case of most of the contributions the issue is raised on too limited a basis, and here Mr. Lunn is responsible, for he calls the tune. Not only are Mr. Lunn's remedies somewhat narrowly conceived, but the Public School is not clearly seen in its wider educational perspective. The real issue is the religious education of a people; it is not likely to be solved by sectional treatment, and it is well to make a constant effort to see each type of school in relation to the others. Distress that there is something wrong with our Public Schools is not quite the same thing as concern for the religious education of our people; this reflection is provoked by the attitudes of at least two of the contributors to this book.

M. V. C. Jeffreys.

THE PEACE OF THE WORLD*

The task of converting a world which has become a neighbourhood into a brotherhood does not proceed apace. The major reason for this may lie in the heritage of the past, for the world became a neighbourhood not for the sake of fellowship—which Aristotle said was the basis of society—but by the force of a competitive economic system. Where there has been competition without a pre-existing brotherhood, there has not unnaturally been division. The evil results of this 'White War,' as Mr. H. G. Wells calls it, and its comico-tragic results from the point of view of human welfare, have, at the time we write, called into being a World Economic Conference. But the most we dare to hope for at present is some limitation of the economic warfare which will allow the nations a breathing space. Such a lull would be all important. It would give time for the peoples to become more internationally minded by the spread of a sound knowledge of each other, and it would allow time for the continued growth of common action in fields less divisive than economics. The peoples, Mr. Laski suggests, are more willing to deal equally with each other than are those in control of the economic machine. But more is wanted. Brotherhood does not spring merely from knowledge, and it springs tardily from moral aspiration. It comes most effectively and naturally out of an honest faith in such a Fatherhood of God as Christianity preaches, which requires us, willy-nilly, to treat other men as brothers. Hence the international importance of sound missionary work; but over and above this the Christian Church will need to recognize, honour and co-operate with this spirit of brotherhood and peace wherever it is fortunate enough to meet it in the other religions of mankind. Professor Bentwich, in his suggestive book, gives some ground for the hope that such a spirit is there to be met.

Professor Laski's book is the Conway Memorial Lecture for 1932, with an introduction by the Chairman, Mr. H. N. Brails-

* *Nationalism and the Future of Civilisation.* By Professor H. J. Laski. (Watts and Co., 1933. 2/-.)

* *The Religious Foundations of Internationalism.* By Professor Norman Bentwich. (Allen and Unwin, 1933. 10/6.)

ford. The main theme is the danger involved in the idea of national sovereignty, and if the theme is not new, it is not yet fully heeded. We are warned that 'a world of competing nation-states, each of which is a law unto itself, produces a civilization incapable of survival,' and 'Modern science means a world-market; a world-market means world-interdependence; world-interdependence means world-government. To act upon the consequences of that tremendous syllogism is the only pathway to our security.' In the Professor's view, the competing financial interests of the governing classes in the different nations have been a main cause of war: the few exploit the patriotism of the many. Thus international security depends on our achieving more than a mere political democracy within the state. The full implication of democracy is, he suggests, 'equality in every aspect of life.'

The writer pleads, therefore, 'for an economically equal society as one of the essential ways of preventing the perversion of national sentiment to the maintenance in power of a wealthy class,' but he is 'not so foolish as to suppose we destroy the dangers of nationalism merely by creating an equal society.' In the end 'the way out is the abrogation of national sovereignty.' The lecture ends with a plea for freedom and tolerance, 'as the sole conditions, known to me, whereby Reason has a chance of victory in human affairs.' The writer hopes *inter alia*, we may one day develop an international writ of *habeas corpus* to remedy the deficiencies of local error. An idealistic and provocative lecture.

For *The Religious Foundations of Internationalism, a study in international relations through the ages,'* we are indebted to Mr. Norman Bentwich, the Weizmann Professor of the International Law of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The interest of the book is increased by being prophetic as well as erudite. 'Jerusalem,' he says in the opening sentence, 'is the place to which half the world looks as the city of peace; and the law of nations derives a large part of its inspiration from the teaching of the prophets of Jerusalem'; the Professor is not afraid to be a votary of peace. He concludes his first chapter—his inaugural lecture 'given in an atmosphere of noisy interruption which was almost comically incongruous with the subject'—with the words, 'If, then, we lift up our eyes to the hills and seek the vision without which the people perish, we may be inspired with hope that in our generation Jerusalem may begin to fulfil again her destiny of guiding humanity to peace, both as the centre of religion and as a centre of science and the humanities.' The book continues with a comprehensive survey of religious influence on peace and war. In the next two chapters on 'Pagan Religions of Antiquity' and 'Judaism and the Nations,' the writer is forced to give space to considering the religious influence on the conduct of war, but when he comes to the Hebrew prophets he brings out their passionate belief in peace and in just dealing as the condition of peace. He emphasises the universal mission of the Jews and perhaps takes a milder view of their failures in this duty than some

historians have done. In three chapters he surveys the influence of Christianity. He criticises the Church for its failure to be true to its first pacifism but recognises that the Church was 'the one influence in Western Europe which held up an ideal of peace.' He traces how 'the "authoritarian egoism" of the Roman Church fostered "anarchical egoism" in a number of national States.' There had come a change of spiritual emphasis. 'Two essential affirmations flow from the Fatherhood of God: the infinite value of the individual man and the unity of the human family. The Reformation stressed the first idea as the Papacy had stressed the second.' That is well said. With the new emphasis came the principle of national sovereignty, which, Mr. Bentwich declares, was the cause of forty-four wars between 1815 and 1915. We have been forced by international conflict to realise that 'the ideals of jurists and the doctrines of universal religion, which had for centuries outstripped the practice of statesmanship, are now necessary axioms of that statesmanship.' Two interesting chapters follow on Islam and on the religions of India and the Far East. The writer insists that 'the notion that Islam was from the beginning aggressively militant and a persecuting faith is an error.' On the contrary Islam by conviction transcends nationalism and has at times given a fine example of tolerance to a persecuting Christian Church. To-day in Moslem countries, Western secular influences have provoked nationalism which in its turn has stimulated religious national feeling; thus in Arab lands religion tends to be associated with nationalism, while in Western Europe it helps towards a brotherhood of peoples. But in Bahaism we have a genuinely religious international movement. A favourite saying of Baha Ullah is quoted: 'Let not a man pride himself that he is a lover of his country but let him take pride that he is a lover of his kind.' The writer's general conclusion about religion in India and the Far East is that, with the exception of Shintoism, it has been 'a permanent force making for peace, goodwill, and brotherhood amongst men.' It has been more effective in the East on national policy, and less so within the nations because of the absence of faith in action and progress. And the writer expects that the present wave of nationalism in the East will be tempered by the influence of the traditional religions. After a not irrelevant discussion of Religious Freedom before and after the Great War, a chapter is given to the idea of a 'League of Religions,' a spiritual counterpart to the League of Nations, and movements towards such a league are discussed, including the ideas of Rudolph Otto, Jean Izoulet, and Benchara Branford. The experience of the League of Nations, Mr. Bentwich holds, 'points to the establishment of permanent executive bodies representing the religious communities, in order to give an effective direction to their common motives.' Whatever we may think of such a far-reaching suggestion yet, when he writes that 'a union of religions would be the soul of the international union of States,' we must needs confess the internationalism of our day patently needs 'a soul.' Interesting alike in its prophetic proposals and its scholarly survey of history, usually fair in its judgments and wide in its sympathies, this book is worth the reading and a significant product of the Hebrew Universty in the City of Peace.

H. G. MULLINER.

THE EVANGELICAL DOCTRINE OF HOLY COMMUNION.*

It is one of the tragedies of Christendom that the Holy Communion, which should be the bond of peace and unity in the Church, should often have been the cause of bitterness and division between fellow-Christians. The reader of Dr. Macdonald's book, in which the writings of representative Churchmen are carefully examined in order to trace the continuance of the evangelical or symbolic interpretation of the Eucharist from St. Paul onwards, is struck by the absence of bitterness which marks the scholarly essays of its contributors.

Dr. Macdonald himself contributes two valuable chapters on the Foundation of Sacramental Doctrine among the Greek and Latin Fathers and in the Early Middle Ages. The enquiry is carried into the Later Middle Ages by the Rev. T. C. Hammond, and a review of the sacramental doctrine of the Continental and English Reformers comes from the pen of Dr. Harold Smith. Dr. W. H. Mackren contributes two chapters on Anti-Roman Apologetics (Carolines, Non-Jurors, and Hanoverism), while a chapter on Free Church Interpretations by Dr. A. H. W. Harrison throws interesting light on the comparatively 'High Church' section of the Wesleys.

To Modern Churchmen the most interesting chapters are the first and the last, by Archdeacon J. W. Hunkin and Canon V. F. Storr respectively. Dr. Hunkin, who writes on the origin of Eucharistic Doctrine in the New Testament, attempts to reconstruct the scene at the Last Supper from the records of the Synoptic Gospels and S. Paul's account in I *Cor.* xi. The conclusion he reaches is that the cup was first blessed and handed to the disciples 'in honour of the Kingdom of God'; then Jesus took bread, and when He had given thanks He brake it and said, 'This is my body.' In giving the cup our Lord 'did not drink Himself or refer to Himself in any way at all except in saying, "Take this, and divide amongst yourselves; for I say unto you I will not drink henceforth of the fruit of the vine, until the Kingdom of God shall come"; so that in connexion with the cup our Lord's language was distinctly eschatological' (p. 18). If this first part of the words of institution may be compared to a kind of toast, there would be no disparagement to the Eucharist when we realize that such a toast can be highly sacramental. Of the second part of the words of institution, Dr. Hunkin takes the words 'This is my body' to mean 'this represents my body'—to be sacrificed as the passover lambs are to be sacrificed on the morrow. If a revision of the Prayer of Consecration were made on these

* *The Evangelical Doctrine of Holy Communion.* Edited by the Rev. A. J. Macdonald. D.D. (W. Heffer & Sons, Cambridge. Second impression, 1933. 330 pp. 5/-.)

lines, omitting the blessing of the cup after the bread and the doubtful words 'do this in remembrance of me,' it would be possible to approach more closely to the meaning and intention of the original dramatic rite.

It is, however, doubtful whether all Evangelicals would be prepared to accept Dr. Hunkin's critical reconstruction, and particularly the omission of the words 'Do this in remembrance of me,' although, if the reading of the Western Text of S. Luke is accepted, I *Cor.* xi, 25, is our only authority for their insertion; similarly Catholics would be equally loth to omit the consecration of the cup after the bread in the traditional manner, although in this case S. Mark is the only independent authority for this usage. But it is only by a fearless regard for the truth and nothing but the truth that our differences can be reconciled, and every independent scholar must agree with Dr. Hunkin that 'the details of the original institution of the Lord's Supper and of the subsequent history of its observance in the earliest time are far from certain. It would be most unwise to base anything that we regard as fundamental for our religion upon uncertain details of this kind. Indeed it is plain — the evidence, in the providence of God, being so scanty — that we are not intended to do so' (p. 37).

Canon Storr's contribution at the end of this volume sums up the previous chapters and reviews the position of Anglican Eucharistic Theology to-day. This he describes as being in a state of transition. 'In the Evangelical wing a new feeling for sacramentalism is arising, and Evangelicals . . . are seeking to discover a fresh eucharistic theology which shall express itself in a new sacramental worship. Anglo-Catholic theologians, aware that in the light of modern knowledge some reinterpretation of the older theories of the real presence is necessary, are engaged in trying to resolve some of the fundamental problems connected with the Eucharist' (p. 312).

In his preface to the second impression of this clearly printed and well-indexed book the editor writes of the demand for the first impression 'especially in the Evangelical Theological Colleges.' It would serve its purpose even better if this cheaper edition were read in all Theological Colleges, as well as by clergy of all schools of thought. A. E. N. Hitchcock.

SHORT NOTICES

MODERN HANDBOOKS*

On the cover of these books we are told that in this series Dr. Bouquet has attempted 'to place within the reach of the student and also the general

* *Modern Handbooks on Religion.* By Dr. A. C. Bouquet, Stanton Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion, University of Cambridge. (Heffer's, 1932-33.)

I. *A Study of the Ordinary Arguments for the Existence and Nature of God.* (2/6 net.)
II. *Religious Experience: Its Nature, Types and Validity.* (3/- net.)
III. *Phases of the Christian Church.* (4/- net.)
IV. *The World We Live In.* (2/6 net.)

reader the main features in the modern view of religion, and it is hoped that it may constitute, when complete, an apologetic fitted for present day needs.' From the Prefatory Note to the first handbook it seems that Dr. Bouquet is specially writing for 'men who begin reading for holy orders'; but he has also in mind the 'Christian minister' and the 'educated layman.' In fact, the first handbook (on the *Arguments for the Existence and Nature of God*) is so condensed that it is probably too difficult for the reader unacquainted with philosophical terms and discussions to derive much benefit from it, while the same over-condensation renders it improbable that an instructed but sceptical enquirer would find the argument convincing. The traditional arguments for God's existence cannot be convincingly reconstructed in a few pages in the present state of metaphysical uncertainty. Candidates for the General Ordination Examination (who are expected by the authorities to be able to use intelligently such terms as 'teleological,' 'the Absolute,' 'ontological,' 'intuition,' and so on) will probably find the first handbook useful for examination purposes; but those who are trained in philosophy will probably be annoyed by its tendency to find short-cuts (because the work is so condensed).

The second handbook (on *Religious Experience*) is much more satisfactory. The object of the book is 'to provide a concise introduction to the psychological study of religion' (p. 3); and the author has done his task efficiently. The book does not suffer greatly from compression; an abundance of illustration is provided; and modern views and theories are explained, criticised or defended with a frankness which is attractive and convincing. The book should be of interest to the general reader.

The third handbook (which deals with Church History) briefly epitomises the development of historical Christianity from New Testament times, but is mainly concerned with a very interesting and instructive discussion of the present position of institutional religion throughout the world, and the relation of Christianity in the twentieth century to such movements as Humanism, Communism, Fascism, and so on. The relations of Church and State are discussed; the position of Anglicanism and that of Roman Catholicism as world-organisations is considered, and the general religious situation of our own age is outlined and discussed in a way which is highly instructive and suggestive. The author writes from a modernist-Anglican standpoint, but he is quick to recognise the valuable elements in Romanism, the Oxford Movement, the Free Churches, or Communism.

The fourth handbook deals with 'the world we live in,' and it attempts to explain in the light of modern science the 'origin, status and prospects of the human race.' It is called 'a modern equivalent of the *Book of Genesis*.' It aims at reaching a wider circle of readers than the first three handbooks—especially 'the younger generation who have been brought up with a scientific background to their education.' The significance of new discoveries about the nature of the physical world is described; the writings of modern physicists, astronomers, biologists and anthropologists are examined with a view to discovering the bearing of the opinions of men of science upon the Christian estimate of the world-process. The work is well written, and would make a suggestive and inexpensive handbook for 'science and religion' study-circles.

We look forward with interest to the completion of his plan by Dr. Bouquet. His undertaking is an ambitious one, but it is a new apologetic of this comprehensive kind which is needed by Christans to-day who wish to understand their faith in the light of the fuller scientific knowledge of the age in which they live.

A.R.

FOLK-LORE*

The material relating to popular beliefs and superstitions throughout the world seems to be almost inexhaustible, and the work of collecting it provides useful occupation for many workers. How vast is the field and how great are the opportunities for explanation is shown by the contents of the Quarterly Review of Myth, Tradition, Institution, and Custom, more briefly described as *Folk-Lore*. The four numbers for 1932 are now available in a bound volume, provided with a good index. Of special interest to readers of the *Modern Churchman* may be the papers on 'The Murderers of St. Thomas Becket in Popular Tradition' (by Tancred Borenius), and 'Were Fairies an Earlier Race of Men?' (by Canon J. A. MacCulloch). The first of these is illustrated by some quaint church-paintings from Winchester, Canterbury and Buckland-in-the-Moor in Devonshire.

The collecting of folk-lore and legends sometimes provides one of the diversions of the country parson. Good and enjoyable work of this kind has been done in Lincolnshire, for instance, by Mr. Penny. There is still plenty of this work to be done, and, since country life is changing so rapidly, if it is not undertaken soon, it will be too late. It is not so profitable as poultry-keeping, but perhaps more worth while. M.A.C.

CHRIST'S RELIGION*

In this book, Canon E. E. Raven, writing 'neither as a theologian nor a scientist . . . but simply as an ordinary parson,' attempts 'to put forward an interpretation of Christ's message which may prove acceptable' to those people who, though 'recognising in Christ's teaching the best that man can achieve . . . are unable to reconcile that teaching with what they find in Christianity to-day' (p. 1). Our author's way of doing this is to endeavour to re-interpret for our own age the historic terms and formularies of theology in order to show that 'what to many people is no more than an empty form of words' really bears, when properly understood, an essential relationship to the Gospel of God's Love. Love is the very heart of Christ's religion, and all experience as well as all theology must be understood in terms of love. Canon Raven has learnt about the meaning and importance of love in human life, not from books, but 'in practical work among men, first in Hoxton and later in Cambridge,' and he has spent nine years in writing down for us the results of his reflection upon the facts of life as he has found them. By many illustrations drawn from his wide experience he shows us with quiet candour and unaffected simplicity the supremacy of love as the key which fits both the practical lock of ordinary everyday living and the theoretical lock of theology and its problems. Perhaps the last section, which deals specifically with such doctrines as those of the Trinity, the Incarnation and the Atonement, leaves us asking more questions than it answers; but its value lies not so much in its actual conclusions as in its attempt to explain everything in ethical rather than in metaphysical terms—in terms of love. The book appeals directly to the whole personality, not to the intellect alone; 'for love, real love, Divine Love, the highest thing to which man can attain, embraces every side of his nature . . . It is a function of his spirit, his "ego," his deepest self' (p. 6). A.R.

* *Folk-Lore*. Vol. XLIII, 1932. (William Glaisher, Ltd. pp. vii, 470.)

* *The Heart of Christ's Religion*. By the Rev. Canon E. E. Raven, Fellow and Dean of St. John's College, Cambridge, and Canon Theologian of Liverpool Cathedral. (Longman's, 1933. Paper, 4/6; cloth, 6/-.)

PETER ABELARD*

In this, her first novel, Miss Helen Wadell makes skilful use of those attainments in sound scholarship which are her's, and which she has so frequently displayed in other *media*. We predict for *Peter Abelard* a large circulation, for it has sufficient learning to serve for the relaxation of the tired scholar, and yet sufficient romantic interest to reach the wider circle of the novel reading public. Miss Waddell has clung fairly closely to the outlines of the original story; she displays a wide acquaintanceship with the world and writings of the scholastics; but does she not err a little in her psychology in permitting Héloïse to leave her only child with hardly the suspicion of a regret? We should liked to have known whether the convent cross Héloïse was called upon to bear was but the loss of a lover, and had the child no place? Nevertheless, this great love story is quite convincingly re-told, and we hope keenly Miss Waddell will make further incursions into the realm of lighter yet sound literature. J.J.A.

CORRESPONDENCE

UNCTION FOR THE SICK.

To the Editor of the *Modern Churchman*.

Sir,

That the Convocation of Canterbury approved, with only two dissentients, the proposal that the use of unction for the sick and the laying-on of hands should be adopted and organised by our Church may lack significance for the average public; but will create no little misgiving in the mind of the comparative student of primitive and higher religions. He, and—let us hope—many others who have insight, will agree that the two dissentients, the Bishops of Birmingham and St. Edmundsbury, 'among the faithless faithful only found,' are fighting the cause both of higher religion and of progressive civilisation, and will feel grateful to Dr. Barnes, to whom our religious debt is already deep, for denouncing the proposal as 'a retrograde step towards religious barbarism.' These practices belong to religious magic, and though their form is refined, they fall into line with countless primitive magic-acts familiar to the anthropologist, many of which are puerile and repulsive, and many are associated with witchcraft. But all of them, savage and refined, can have a therapeutic value, in respect of which modern psychology has made many interesting discoveries. It is probably these that the Bishop of Truro has in mind, when he acclaims the proposal as 'keeping in step with psychological science.' But the Bishop of Truro may not be aware that we pay too high a price for such 'therapeutics': that they trail with them a very dangerous miasma: and that no disease which priest-blessed oil can cure is as disastrous as the disease of believing that priest-blessed oil can cure it.

Yours faithfully,

Parkstone. Lewis R. Farnell.

CARDINAL NEWMAN'S EFFEMINACY.

Sir,

As the eldest (except my sister) of the relatives of Cardinal Newman I write and protest against the letter of your correspondent 'E.B.' entitled 'Newman's effeminacy.'

* *Peter Abelard*. A novel by Helen Waddell. (Constable & Co., 1933. 7/6.)

My protest is principally due to the fact that Newman is stated in the letter to be 'homosexual.' There is no dictionary definition of that word, but 'E.B.' must know perfectly well its usual meaning. He professes to be a psychologist. Is he so obtuse as not to be aware of the danger that a reader might think that meaning to be in 'E.B.'s' mind, and might so quote it? Was it necessary to use that one particular word, or could not his meaning have been conveyed in a kindlier fashion? An attack on a dead man—at the centenary of his especial greatness—by an anonymous correspondent, is a somewhat cowardly affair. Perhaps 'E.B.' will come into the open and give us his name.

E. N. MOZLEY (*Colonel*).

The Church Institute, Leeds.
June 30th, 1933.

CARDINAL NEWMAN AND HOMOSEXUALITY.

SIR,

Perhaps the fact that Colonel Mozley cannot find the word 'homosexual' in his dictionary explains why he objects to it as applied to his famous relation. It is a common mistake to pronounce the word with a long 'o,' and to imagine that it comes from 'homo,' *a man*. It should be pronounced with the 'o' short, because it comes from the Greek and not the Latin, from 'homos' *same*, as in words like 'homomorphous,' of similar form, 'homogamous,' of a plant that has all the florets of the same sex, or 'homophonic' of music that is of the same pitch. It is often complained and rightly, that scientific men are so bad at coining new words; and this is a conspicuous example. The clumsy word, however, was invented by scientists because of important new discoveries in psychology; and all we can do is prevent its being misunderstood or mispronounced.

One cannot but sympathise with the piety (if again I may use a word in its classical sense) of Colonel Mozley in taking up arms for a relative; yet surely no-one can maintain the principle that a famous man may not be criticised a hundred years after his emergence. As a matter of fact, Newman's apostacy was one of the major disasters to religion in the nineteenth century, disintegrating our traditional loyalties, poisoning the Oxford Movement, which might have developed into a real revival of Christian activity and church unity, and encouraging the agnosticism that spread so widely and has left us the inheritance of its confusion. Newman desired none of these things; but his emotional constitution determined his thinking, as it does with us all; and it drove him, womanlike, into the arms of a master to whom he could surrender himself.

Our grandfathers could not understand that emotional drive, because psychology was in its infancy; and they were apt to be sentimental about Newman and to exaggerate his rather mediocre powers as a poet and a writer of prose. It is to the interest of the Roman Church to keep the legend going as long as possible; yet he is very little read now by Roman Catholics and hardly at all by others.

The explanation is, as your admirable essay showed, that Newman was once a man of mystery, because people could not understand how one so honourable could have betrayed the religion of his country; but that now the mystery is solved. Those who prefer it can use the word 'effeminacy' if they like; but the word 'homosexual' is more scientific; indeed the reason why 'effeminate' was always regarded as unflattering is because it was used to cover what we now define as homosexual.

The fact is that men who are healthy in body and mind, and normal in temperament, are heterosexual, as God made us. We have only to watch those of Romanizing proclivities among our acquaintance to see that abnormality of sexual temperament is the urge behind their peculiarities.

It is important that this should be realised among thoughtful people. For indeed the failures and aberrations which make church history such melancholy reading are due to the premium that was set by clerical celibacy and monasticism on men and women of abnormal temperament and—in the literal sense of the phrase—without affection. In every generation there appear some who are unsexed, subsexed, homosexual—or if other terms are preferred, unmanly, unwomanly, effeminate, womanish, mannish—there are many words, all of which bear witness to the sense of discomfort which normal people feel. Medical men tend to the opinion that such shifting of the natural balance is mainly due to environment and not to birth, and is mainly caused and formed during the years of childhood and adolescence.

The tragedy of church history is that from the first aberrations of Marcion in the second century, temperamental abnormality has been considered a virtue. In our own country fatherhood was forbidden to the clergy for six centuries—from St. Dunstan to Cranmer. In the Romanist Church (and even in the Eastern Church, so far as the all-important directive power—the episcopate—goes) the rule is, No man who leads a natural life can be priest, bishop, or pope. And how much in modern Romanist devotions has emanated from the unsexed inhabitants of the nunneries. Everyone knows about this in a country like France.

I am sorry that professional reasons prevent my publishing my name.

E.B.

NEWMAN'S EFFEMINACY.

SIR,

A psycho-analyst, *qua* psycho-analyst, is no more fitted to understand a saint than is a navvy, *qua* navvy, to criticise a work of art. Anyone with any real knowledge of the doctrines of Freud knows that there is no place in them for the things of the spirit, and that therefore all manifestations of spiritual life are explained as manifestations of an abnormal and diseased psychology. It is as though a doctor, denying the truth of the germ theory, should try to explain an epidemic.

I understand that a distinguished psychologist of the school of Nancy has recently put forward the theory that Jesus was mentally diseased. The only possible reply to this, for the Christian, is 'Then thank God for mental disease.'

I.H.

[A Roman Catholic lady correspondent, whose views, as she moved in the circle of Newman's relations and friends, seem to us to deserve serious attention, writes:—'He was not homosexual or inhuman, and he did not hate women. He was on terms of tender affection with his mother and sisters. How far his great feeling for Miss Giberne went is uncertain. I have heard that she causd him to waver in his determination not to marry . . . He always corresponded with Mrs. Froude, another very able woman, and his friendship with Mrs. Wootten, the widow of an old friend, who acted as matron at his school, was a very pleasant one . . . Of course Newman held celibacy to be the perfect life, the life that unites man to God in a special way, and of course that belief entails a rather low view of the marriage tie . . . Celibacy brings a sort of *gêne* into a man's relations with women, and Newman suffered from his celibacy, perhaps unconsciously, but he was not homosexual.'—ED., *M.C.*]

THE COLLECT FOR TRINITY.

SIR,

Does anyone who uses the collect appointed for Trinity Sunday in our *Book of Common Prayer* comply with the apostolic resolve: 'I will pray with the spirit, and I will pray with the understanding also'? To me this seems impossible in one of its phrases. I can attach no intelligible meaning to the affirmation that we are given grace 'in the power of the Divine majesty to worship the Unity.' Grace to worship; yes. But what sense lies in the addition 'to worship in the power of the Divine majesty'?

But the fault does not lie, I think, in this old collect from the sacramentary of Gregory, only in its English rendering. Most of Cranmer's translations are wonderfully good, and the collects as given us by him in our mother tongue are as a whole finer prayers than the Latin originals, in my opinion, though one can point to loss as well as gain. But in this particular case is there not definite mistranslation due to misunderstanding of the connexion between the words in this condensed and rather obscure phrase?

. . . deus, qui dedisti famulis tuis in confessione vere fidei eterne trinitatis gloriam agnoscere, et in potentia majestatis adorare unitatem, quosumus . . . So runs the original. Here '*majestatis*' is surely not dependent on '*potentia,*' but on '*unitatem.*' And '*potentia*' is not connected with '*majestatis,*' but with '*fidei.*' Here is the principal mistake made; but there are further errors of translation when '*in confessione*' is rendered 'by the confession' when it really means 'in the course of our confession,' and again when '*agnoscere*' is rendered 'acknowledge' when the sense it bears here is 'recognise,' or better 'discern.' Nor is 'defend us from' quite equivalent to '*muniamur.*'

If these points are corrected the collect may run in English as follows:—'Almighty and everlasting God, who hast given to thy servants in their confession of true faith to discern the glory of thine eternal trinity, and in the power of their faith to worship the unity of thy Divine majesty, We beseech thee that by the strength of that same faith we may ever be fortified against all adversaries; Who livest and reignest one God world without end.'

The few words here added to the condensed and almost crabbed Latin are required by the freer English idiom, and in order to make the connexions of the thought clear. Does not the prayer become thus not only intelligible throughout, but also a fuller and nobler utterance of worship, which is its very purpose?

E. P. BOYS SMITH.

Glyder's Close,
Ringwood.

A MUCH MISINTERPRETED TEXT.

SIR,

The Text 'Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets, I am not come to destroy but to fulfil' is continually quoted by teachers whose avowed purpose it is to build up a quasi-Judaic system within a Christian framework. But the words of our Lord, far from favouring such an interpretation are, when examined, clearly contrary to it. If a medical man, after carefully examining a patient, were to turn to the relatives and say 'I am not come to kill but to cure him,' the words would either partake of the nature of a bad joke or they would be preliminary to the suggestion of such a drastic and revolutionary course of treatment that the relatives would shrink from it as fatal.

So with the words of the text. Unless Christ's Gospel had been of such a character that it seemed utterly subversive of religion they would have been wholly out of place. The fact that the Lord Jesus spoke these words is the clearest possible proof of the essentially radical nature of His religion. I do not say 'of Christianity' the word is too redolent of corpse-like systems. After all the disciples did not call themselves Christians. The apostles preferred, in addressing their converts, terms which implied a common outlook on life, a life which is life indeed, which brings everything that is pertinent to true life with it which makes all things new. That is founded on experience, our experience which is in deed and in truth Catholic because all true followers share it. We know so little yet we know all things. We have the witness in ourselves, corroborated by the witness of all who in every age and in every land hear and heed the Spirit's call. This is the Catholic Faith.

ANDREW KEOGH.

Lifton, Devon.

DR. BARNES' GIFFORD LECTURES.

SIR,

I venture to suggest that the development of Good and Bad alike in the process of Evolution is in large measure explicable if we posit something in the nature of freedom of choice (entailing consciousness, however rudimentary) in all living things, and a prevailing Divine Influence towards self-development by overcoming difficulties.

The choice of the Broad Way would result in those sinister developments of life for which direct responsibility seems to rest with God. Mind and life may well be inseparables.

G. S. THOMAS, M.A.

Headington, Oxford.
June 18th, 1933.

SIR,

In his review of Dr. Barnes' Gifford Lectures Mr. Russell says: 'Dr. Barnes calls attention to the serious difficulty that is constituted for religious faith by the fact that the variations upon which the whole process of evolution is founded are apparently non-moral. Good and bad arise alike. They have led to odious parisitism and microbic disease, as well as to parental self-sacrifice and the instinct for truth. And the ultimate responsibility for this must rest with God . . . Dr. Barnes has no final answer for this difficulty.'

It has always seemed to me that the only hypothesis that will meet this problem is that every living being down to the amoeba, or even lower still, must have a certain amount of free will. Is there any overwhelming objection to this theory?

E. E. BRADFORD, D.D.

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CORRIGENDUM.

Read p. 158, lines 16, 17 in the review of Dr. Barnes' *Gifford Lectures*: The theory of Relativity has made it more, rather than less, difficult to see God's will in the physical realm.